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Abstract
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unaware-
ness of actions. We extend Pearce’s (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated)
rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence. We de-
fine also a new variant of this solution concept, prudent rationalizability, which
refines the set of outcomes induced by extensive-form rationalizable strategies. We
apply prudent rationalizability to the analysis of verifiable communication with
unawareness. Finally, we define the normal form of a generalized extensive-form
game, and characterize in it extensive-form rationalizability by iterative conditional
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1 Introduction
In real-life dynamic interactions, unawareness of players regarding the relevant actions
available to them is at least as prevalent as uncertainty regarding other players’ strategies,
payoffs or moves of nature. Players frequently become aware of actions they (or other
players) could have taken in retrospect, when they can only re-evaluate the past actions
chosen by partners or rivals who were aware of those actions from the start, and hence
re-assess their likely future behavior. Yet, while uncertainty can be captured within the
standard framework of extensive-form games with imperfect information, unawareness
and mutual uncertainty regarding awareness require an extension of this framework.
Such an extension is the first task of the current paper.
At first, one may wonder why the standard framework would not suffice. After all, if
a player is unaware of an action which is actually available to her, then for all practical
purposes she cannot choose it. Why wouldn’t it be enough simply to truncate from the
tree all the paths starting with such an action?
The reason is that the strategic implications of unawareness of an action are distinct
from the unavailability of the same action. To see this, consider the following standard
“battle-of-the-sexes”game (where Bach and Stravinsky concerts are the two available
choices for each player)
II
B S
B 3 1 0 0
I
, , 
S 0 0 1 3, , 
augmented by a dominant Mozart concert for player II:
II
B S M
B 3, 1 0, 0 0, 4
I S 0, 0 1, 3 0, 4
M 0, 0 0, 0 2, 6
The new game is dominance solvable, and (M,M) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that the Mozart concert is in a distant town, and II can go there only if player
I gives him her car in the first place: Here, if player I doesn’t give the car to player II,
player II may conclude by forward induction that player I would go to the Bach concert
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Figure 1:
I
not give car 
to player II 
give car 
to player II
II
B S M
B 3, 1 0, 0 0, 4
II
B S
I
B 3, 1 0, 0
I S 0, 0 1, 3 0, 4
M 0, 0 0, 0 2, 6
S 0,0 1,3
M 0, 0 0, 0
with the hope of getting the payoff 3 (because by giving the car to II, player I could have
achieved the payoff 2). The best reply of player II is to follow suit and attend the Bach
concert as well. Hence, in the unique rationalizable outcome, player I is not to give the
car to player II and to go to the Bach concert.1
But what if, instead, the Mozart concert is in town but player II is initially unaware
of the Mozart concert, while player I can enable player II to go to the concert simply by
telling him about it? If player II remains unaware of the Mozart concert, then neither
does he conceive that player I could have told him about the Mozart concert, and in
particular he cannot carry out any forward-induction calculation. For him, the game is
a standard battle-of-the-sexes game, where both actions of player I are rationalizable.
This strategic situation is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2:
I
not tell player II about
the Mozart concert
tell player II about
the Mozart concert
II
B S M
B 3, 1 0, 0 0, 4
II
B S
I
B 3, 1 0, 0
I S 0, 0 1, 3 0, 4
M 0, 0 0, 0 2, 6
S 0, 0 1, 3
M 0, 0 0, 0
II
B S
I
B 3, 1 0, 0
S 0, 0 1, 3
1For a discussion of forward induction in battle-of-the-sexes games see van Damme (1989).
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The strategic situation is not a standard extensive-form game (more on this in Section
2.6 below). If player I chooses not to tell player II about the Mozart concert, then player
II’s information set (depicted in blue) consists of a node in a simpler game –namely the
one-shot battle-of-the-sexes with no preceding move by player I.
This is a simple example of the general novel framework that we define in Section 2 for
dynamic interaction with possibly mutual unawareness of actions, generalizing standard
extensive-form games. The framework will not only allow modeling of situations in which
one player is certain that another player is unaware of portions of the game tree, as in the
above example, but also of situations in which a player is uncertain regarding the way
another player views the game tree, as well as situations in which the player is uncertain
regarding the uncertainties of the other player about yet other players’ views of the game
tree, and so forth.
In fact, this framework allows not just for unawareness but also for other forms of
misconception about the structure of the game. Section 6 specifies further properties
obtaining in generalized extensive-form games where the only source of players ‘miscon-
ception’ is unawareness and mutual unawareness of available actions and paths in the
game. Since we focus on this type of unawareness, most of the examples in the paper
satisfy the further properties specified in Section 6. Nevertheless, modeling awareness of
unawareness does require the general framework in Section 2, as explained at its end.
In this new framework, for each information set of a player her strategy specifies –
from the point of view of the modeler – what the player would do if and when that
information set of hers is ever reached. In this sense, a player does not necessarily ‘own’
her full strategy at the beginning of the game, because she might not be initially aware
of all of her information sets. That’s why a sensible generalization of Pearce’s (1984)
notion of extensive-form rationalizability is non-trivial.
In Section 3 we put forward a modified definition, prove existence, and show the
sense in which it coincides with extensive-form rationalizability in standard extensive-
form games.
We focus here on a rationalizability solution concept rather than on some notion of
equilibrium. While an equilibrium is ideally interpreted as a rest-point of some dynamic
learning or adaptation process, or alternatively as a pre-meditated agreement or expec-
tation, we find it difficult to carry over such interpretations to a setting in which every
increase of awareness is by definition a shock or a surprise. Once a player’s view of
the game itself is challenged in the course of play, it is hard to justify the idea that a
convention or an agreement for the continuation of the game are readily available.
4
We chose to focus on extensive-form rationalizability because it embodies forward
induction reasoning. If an opponent makes a player aware of some relevant aspect of
reality, it is implausible to dismiss the increased level of awareness as an unintended
consequence of the opponent’s behavior. Rather, the player should try to rationalize
the opponent’s choice, re-interpret the opponent’s past behavior, and try to infer from
it the opponent’s future moves. Extensive-form rationalizability indeed captures a ‘best
rationalization principle’ (Battigalli, 1997).
With rationalizability, generalized games are necessary for properly modeling un-
awareness; trying to model unawareness by having the unaware player assigning prob-
ability zero to the contingency of which she is unaware might give rise to a completely
different rationalizable behavior, which does not square with unawareness in the proper
sense of the word. To see this consider the following example.
A Decision Maker (DM) has to choose between two policies, a0 and a1. Before choos-
ing she gets a recommendation from an expert via a narrow communication channel,
through which the expert can recommend either “0” or “1”. The expert makes the rec-
ommendation after observing the state of nature, which may be either γ0 or γ1, and which
the DM does not see. The interests of the expert and the DM are completely aligned:
They each bear a cost of 1 if a1 is implemented when the state of nature is γ0 or vice
versa. The expert furthermore bears a cost of 10 from “lying”, i.e. from recommending
“0” when the state of nature is γ1 or recommending “1” when the state of nature is γ0.
Assume the DM is aware only of the state γ0 and unaware of γ1. The dynamic
interaction is hence modeled by the generalized game in Figure 3.
Figure 3:
c
E E
γ0 γ1
DM0 1 DM0 1
DM
a0 a1 a0 a1
DM
a0 a1 a0 a1
0, 0 ‐1, ‐1 0, ‐10 ‐1, ‐11 ‐1, ‐11 0, ‐10 ‐1, ‐1 0, 0
c
γ0
E
DM
1DM 0
a0 a1 a0 a1
0, 0 ‐1, ‐1 0, ‐10 ‐1, ‐11
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In this generalized game the only extensive-form rationalizable strategy of the DM is
to always implement the policy a0: she does not conceive of a contingency that would
make the policy a1 superior to a0 even if she hears from the expert the recommendation
“1”; in such a case she regrettably concludes that the expert behaved in an irrational
way and bore the cost of “lying”.
However, if we were to model the DM alternatively as being aware of γ1 but assigning
probability zero to it, the strategic interaction would be modeled by the standard game
in Figure 4.
Figure 4:
c
E E
γ0 γ1
DM
0 1 0 1
DM
a0 a1 a0 a1 a0 a1 a0 a1
0, 0 ‐1, ‐1 0, ‐10 ‐1, ‐11 ‐1, ‐11 0, ‐10 ‐1, ‐1 0, 0
In this game the unique extensive-form rationalizable strategy of the DM is to choose
a0 upon hearing “0” from the expert, but to implement a1 upon hearing the recommen-
dation “1”. Indeed, extensive-form rationalizability requires the DM to base her choice
on a system of beliefs about the expert’s strategies with which at every information set
of hers she maintains a belief that best rationalizes the choices of the expert which could
have led to that information set. In particular, upon hearing the recommendation “1”
from the expert, the only way for the DM to rationalize it is to assume that the state of
nature is nevertheless γ1, where recommending “1” is strictly dominant for the expert;
and in γ1 the optimal choice for the DM is a1.
Conceptually, upon hearing the surprising recommendation “1” both choices of the
DM have their internal logic. The former gives priority to “only γ0 is conceivable”,
the latter to the rationality of the expert. But in the latter case, if initially the DM is
genuinely unaware of γ1, there is no reason why the DM would conceive precisely of γ1 and
not of some alternative description γ′1 of nature that would also rationalize the expert’s
recommendation “1”; some such conceptualizations γ′1 need not necessarily induce the
DM to adopt the expert’s recommendation. Generalized games lend themselves also
to modeling such misconceptions that may arise upon a surprise, as demonstarted in
Figure 5. Here, the DM’s rationalizable strategy is to choose a0 also upon hearing the
(surprising) recommendation “1” , because the DM believes this recommendation was
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Figure 5:
c
c
E E
γ0 γ1
E E
DM
DM
0 1
DM
0 1
γ0
DM
DM
0 1
a0 a1 a0 a1
DM
DM
0 1
a0 a1 a0 a1
γ1’
a0 a1 a0 a1
0, 0 ‐1, ‐1 0, ‐10 ‐1, ‐11
a0 a1 a0 a1
0, ‐11 ‐1, ‐10 0, ‐1 ‐1, 0
c
E
DM
γ0
0, 0 ‐1, ‐1 0, ‐10 ‐1, ‐11 ‐1, ‐11 0, ‐10 ‐1, ‐1 0, 0
DM 0 1
a0 a1 a0 a1
0 0 ‐1 ‐1 0 ‐10 ‐1 ‐11,  ,  ,  , 
strictly dominant for the expert but that her interest and those of the expert are now
opposed.
In Section 4 we introduce a related solution concept, prudent rationalizability, which
is the direct generalization of iterated admissibility to dynamic games with unawareness.
Unlike in normal-form games, this generalization is surprisingly not always a refinement
of extensive-form rationalizability (even for standard extensive-form games). However,
we prove that prudent rationalizable strategies do refine the set of outcomes obtainable
by extensive-form rationalizable strategies. We show how prudent rationalizability is
effective in ruling out less plausible rationalizable outcomes in examples due to Pearce
(1984) and Ozbay (2007).
Of particular interest is the application of prudent rationalizability to the Milgrom-
Roberts (1986) communication game, in which a sender sends a verifiable (and hence
correct) piece of information to a receiver who makes a decision on its basis. Milgrom
and Roberts (1986) showed that the unique sequential equilibrium in this game features
full unraveling of information, and that at equilibrium the receiver interprets each piece
of information in the most ‘skeptical’ manner. We show that the complete unraveling
outcome is also the unique outcome in prudent strategies, and hence that it hinges on
rationalizability (or, more precisely, on prudence) considerations and does not require the
full power of equilibrium analysis. Nevertheless, we show that if the certified information
has multiple dimensions and the receiver is unaware of some of them, then complete
unraveling need not occur with prudent strategies. Thus, this is yet another example in
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which unawareness has strategic implications which are genuinely different than those
implied by asymmetric information.
In standard game theory, the extensive form has been considered as a more complete
description of the strategic situation than the normal form. This has been questioned by
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) who argued that the normal form contains all strategically
relevant information. For standard extensive-form games, Shimoji and Watson (1998)
showed how extensive-form reasoning embodied in extensive-form rationalizability can be
carried out in the normal form. Arguably generalized extensive-form games contain more
”time relevant” structure than standard extensive-form games since they also formalize
changes in the awareness of players. It is therefore an intriguing question whether a
solution to generalized extensive-form games can be found when the analysis is carried
out in the appropriately defined normal form associated to a generalized extensive-form
game. In Section 5 we define the normal form associated to general extensive-form games.
We extend Shimoji and Watson’ characterization of extensive-form rationalizability by
iterated conditional strict dominance to games with unawareness. In some applications,
it may be more practical to apply iterated conditional strict dominance in the normal
form rather than extensive-form rationalizability.
Our framework for dynamic interaction under unawareness seems to be simpler than
the one proposed by Halpern and Reˆgo (2006) and Reˆgo and Halpern (2007), in which
they investigated the notions of Nash and sequential equilibrium, respectively. Feinberg
(2009) defines unawareness by explicit unbounded sequences of mutual “views” of the
game, with analogous properties both for static and for dynamic games. In his dynamic
setting, he does not impose perfect recall, which might hamper the extension of known
solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or extensive-form rationalizability that
rely on perfect recall; in contrast, extensive-form rationalizability and prudent rational-
izability are the focal solution concepts that we extend and define and analyze in our
paper, and to this effect we extend the definition of perfect recall to our setting. Li (2006)
considered dynamic unawareness with perfect information, while our framework allows
for both unawareness and imperfect information.
Ozbay (2007) studies sender-receiver games, in which an ‘announcer’ can make an
unaware decision maker aware of more states of nature before the decision maker takes
an action. Such games can also be naturally formulated as a particular instance of
our framework. For these games Ozbay studies an equilibrium notion incorporating
forward-induction reasoning. Filiz-Ozbay (2007) studies a related setting in which the
aware announcer is a risk neutral insurer, while the decision maker is a risk averse or
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ambiguity averse insuree. At equilibrium, the insurer does not always reveal all relevant
contingencies to the insuree.2
Our aim is to provide a general framework for modeling misperceptions about the
availability of actions in dynamic strategic situations. Different kinds of perception biases
among players in games have been a popular topic in the recent literature on behavioral
game theory. For instance, in static games Eyster and Rabin (2005) analyze players
with correct conjectures about opponents’ actions but misperceptions about how those
opponents’ actions are correlated with the opponents’ information. In multi-stage games
with moves of nature, Jehiel (2005) studies players that bundle nodes at which other
players choose into “analogy classes”, correctly anticipate the average behavior for each
analogy class, and thus may have misperceptions about how others’ behavior is related
others’ information. Recently there has been a renaissance of non-equilibrium iterative
solution concepts in behavioral game theory like level-k thinking and related models
(e.g. Stahl and Wilson, 1995, Camerer, Hu and Chong, 2004, Crawford and Iriberri,
2007). Note that our iterative solution concepts, would-be rationalizability and prudent
rationalizability, do not only provide behavioral predictions in the limit but also at every
finite level of rationalization.
2 Generalized extensive-form games
To define a generalized extensive-form game Γ, consider first, as a building block, a finite
perfect information game with a set of players I, a set of decision nodes N0, active players
In at node n with finite action sets A
i
n of player i ∈ In (for n ∈ N0), chance nodes C0,
and terminal nodes Z0 with a payoff vector (p
z
i )i∈I ∈ RI for the players for every z ∈ Z0.
The nodes N¯0 = N0 ∪ C0 ∪ Z0 constitute a tree.
2.1 Partially ordered set of trees
Consider now a family T of subtrees of N¯0, partially ordered () by inclusion. One of
the trees T1 ∈ T is meant to represent the modeler’s view of the paths of play that are
objectively feasible; each other tree represents the feasible paths of play as subjectively
viewed by some player at some node at one of the trees.
2Currently we are unaware of further papers focusing directly and explicitly on dynamic
games with unawareness. The literature on unawareness in general is growing fast – see e.g.
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/schipper/unaw.htm
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In each tree T ∈ T denote by nT the copy in T of the node n ∈ N0 whenever the copy
of n is part of the tree T . However, in what follows we will typically avoid the subscript
T when no confusion may arise.
Denote by NTi the set of nodes in which player i ∈ I is active in the tree T ∈ T.
We require two properties:
1. All the terminal nodes in each tree T ∈ T are copies of nodes in Z0.
2. If for two decision nodes n, n′ ∈ NTi (i.e. i ∈ In∩In′) it is the case that Ain∩Ain′ 6= ∅,
then Ain = A
i
n′ .
3
Property 1 is needed to ensure that each terminal node of each tree T ∈ T is associated
with well defined payoffs to the players. Property 2 means that i’s active nodes NTi are
partitioned into equivalence classes, such that the actions available to player i are identical
within each equivalence class and disjoint in distinct equivalence classes. It will be needed
for the definition of information sets which follows shortly.
Denote by N the union of all decision nodes in all trees T ∈ T, by C the union of all
chance nodes, by Z the union of terminal nodes, and by N¯ = N ∪ C ∪ Z. For a node
n ∈ N¯ we denote by Tn the tree containing n.
2.2 Information sets
Next, in each decision node n ∈ N , define for each active player i ∈ In an information
set pii (n) with the following properties:
I0 Confinement: pii (n) ⊆ T for some tree T .
I1 No delusion: If pii(n) ⊆ Tn then n ∈ pii(n).
I2 Introspection: If n′ ∈ pii (n) then pii (n′) = pii (n).
I3 No divining of currently unimaginable paths, no expectation to forget currently
conceivable paths: If n′ ∈ pii (n) ⊆ T ′ (where T ′ ∈ T is a tree) and there is a path
n′, . . . , n′′ ∈ T ′ such that i ∈ In′ ∩ In′′ then pii (n′′) ⊆ T ′.
3Sometimes the modeler may want to impose an additional property: If in the original tree the
probabilities of reaching n¯1, . . . n¯k ∈ N¯ from the chance node c ∈ C are pn¯1c > 0, . . . , pn¯kc > 0 but some
of these nodes do not appear in the subtree, then the probabilities of reaching the remaining nodes
emanating from c are renormalized so as to sum to 1 in the subtree. We do not impose this property
here since it may be natural in some contexts but unnatural in others.
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I4 No imaginary actions: If n′ ∈ pii (n) then Ain′ ⊆ Ain.
I5 Distinct action names in disjoint information sets: For a subtree T , if n, n′ ∈ T and
Ain = A
i
n′ then pii (n
′) = pii (n).
I6 Perfect recall: Suppose that player i is active in two distinct nodes n1 and nk, and
there is a path n1, n2, ..., nk such that at n1 player i takes the action ai. If n
′ ∈
pii (nk) , then there exists a node n
′
1 6= n′ and a path n′1, n′2, ..., n′` = n′ such that
pii (n
′
1) = pii (n1) and at n
′
1 player i takes the action ai.
The following figures (Figure 6) illustrate properties I0 to I6.
Properties (I1), (I2), (I4), and (I5) are standard for extensive-form games, and prop-
erties (I0) and (I6) generalize other standard properties of extensive-form games to our
generalized setting. The essentially new property is (I3). At each information set of a
player, property (I3) confines the player’s anticipation of her future view of the game to
the view she currently holds (even if, as a matter of fact, this anticipation is about to be
shuttered as the game evolves).
We denote by Hi the set of i’s information sets in all trees. For an information set
hi ∈ Hi, we denote by Thi the tree containing hi. For two information sets hi, h′i in a
given tree T, we say that hi precedes h
′
i (or that h
′
i succeeds hi) if for every n
′ ∈ h′i there
is a path n, ..., n′ such that n ∈ hi. We denote hi  h′i.
Remark 1 The following property is implied by I2 and I4: If n′, n′′ ∈ hi where hi = pii (n)
is an information set, then Ain′ = A
i
n′′.
Proof. If n′, n′′ ∈ hi where hi = pii(n) is some information set, then by introspection
(I3) we must have pii(n
′) = pii(n′′) = pii(n). Hence by (I4) Ain′ ⊆ Ain′′ and Ain′′ ⊆ Ain′ . 
Remark 2 Properties I0, I1, I2 and I6 imply no absent-mindedness: No information
set hi contains two distinct nodes n, n
′ on some path in some tree.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exists an information set hi with a node
n ∈ hi such that some other node in hi precedes n in the tree Tn. Denote by n′ the first
node on the path from the root to n that is also in hi. Now apply I6 with n
′
l := n
′ to get
a path n′′ = n′1, ..., n
′
l = n
′, with pii(n′′) = pii(n1) = pii(n′) = hi. By I1, we have n′′ ∈ hi
and n′′ is a predecessor of n′, a contradiction. 
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Figure 6: Properties I0 to I6
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The perfect recall property I6 and Remark 2 guarantee that with the precedence
relation  player i’s information sets Hi form an arborescence: For every information
set h′i ∈ Hi, the information sets preceding it {hi ∈ Hi : hi  h′i} are totally ordered by
 .
For trees T, T ′ ∈ T we denote T  T ′ whenever for some node n ∈ T and some player
i ∈ In it is the case that pii (n) ⊆ T ′. Denote by ↪→ the transitive closure of . That is,
T ↪→ T ′′ iff there is a sequence of trees T, T ′, . . . , T ′′ ∈ T satisfying T  T ′ · · · T ′′.
2.3 Generalized games
A generalized extensive-form game Γ consists of a partially ordered set T of subtrees of
a tree N¯0 satisfying properties 1-2 above, along with information sets pii (n) for every
n ∈ T, T ∈ T and i ∈ In, satisfying properties I0-I6 above.
For every tree T ∈ T, the T -partial game is the partially ordered set of trees including
T and all trees T ′ in Γ satisfying T ↪→ T ′, with information sets as defined in Γ. A T -
partial game is a generalized game, i.e. it satisfies all properties 1-2 and I0-I6.
We denote by HTi the set of i’s information sets in the T -partial game.
2.4 Strategies
A (pure) strategy
si ∈ Si ≡
∏
hi∈Hi
Ahi
for player i specifies an action of player i at each of her information sets hi ∈ Hi. Denote
by
S =
∏
j∈I
Sj
the set of strategy profiles in the generalized extensive-form game.
If si = (ahi)hi∈Hi ∈ Si, we denote by
si (hi) = ahi
the player’s action at the information set hi. If player i is active at node n, we say that
at node n the strategy prescribes to her the action si (pii (n)).
In generalized extensive-form games, a strategy cannot be conceived as an ex ante
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plan of action. If hi ⊆ T but T 6↪→ T ′, then at hi player i may be interpreted as being
unaware of her information sets in HT
′
i \HTi .
Thus, a strategy of player i should rather be viewed as a list of answers to the
hypothetical questions “what would the player do if hi were the set of nodes she considered
as possible?”, for hi ∈ Hi. However, there is no guarantee that such a question about
the information set h′i ∈ HT ′i would even be meaningful to the player if it were asked
at a different information set hi ∈ HTi when T 6↪→ T ′. The answer should therefore be
interpreted as given by the modeler, as part of the description of the situation.
For a strategy si ∈ Si and a tree T ∈ T, we denote by sTi the strategy in the T -partial
game induced by si. If Ri ⊆ Si is a set of strategies of player i, denote by RTi the set of
strategies induced by Ri in the T -partial game, The set of i’s strategies in the T -partial
game is thus denoted by STi . Denote by S
T =
∏
j∈I S
T
j the set of strategy profiles in the
T -partial game.
We say that a strategy profile s ∈ S reaches the information set hi ∈ Hi if the players’
actions and nature’s moves (if there are any) in Thi lead to hi with a positive probability.
(Notice that unlike in standard games, an information set pii (n) may be contained in tree
T ′ 6= Tn. In such a case, by definition si (pii (n)) induces an action to player i also in n
and not only in the nodes of pii (n).)
We say that the strategy si ∈ Si reaches the information set hi if there is a strategy
profile s−i ∈ S−i of the other players such that the strategy profile (si, s−i) reaches hi.
Otherwise, we say that the information set hi is excluded by the strategy si.
Similarly, we say that the strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i reaches the information set hi if
there exists a strategy si ∈ Si such that the strategy profile (si, s−i) reaches hi.
A strategy profile (sj)j∈I reaches a node n ∈ T if the players’ actions sj (pij (n′))j∈I
and nature’s moves in the nodes n′ ∈ T lead to n with a positive probability. Since we
consider only finite trees, (sj)j∈I reaches an information set hi ∈ Hi if and if there is a
node n ∈ hi such that (sj)j∈I reaches n.
As is the case also in standard games, for every given node, a given strategy profile of
the players induces a distribution over terminal nodes in each tree, and hence an expected
payoff for each player in the tree.
For an information set hi, let sis˜
hi
i denote the strategy that is obtained by replacing
actions prescribed by si at the information set hi and its successors by actions prescribed
by s˜i. The strategy si/s˜
hi
i is called an hi-replacement of si.
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The set of behavioral strategies is ∏
hi∈Hi
∆ (Ahi) .
2.5 Awareness of unawareness
In some strategic situations a player may be aware of her unawareness in the sense
that she is suspicious that something is amiss without being able to conceptualize this
‘something’. Such a suspicion may affect her payoff evaluations for actions that she knows
are available to her. More importantly, she may take actions to investigate her suspicion
if such actions are physically available.
To model awareness of unawareness some of the trees may include imaginary actions
as placeholders for actions that a player may be unaware of and terminal nodes/evaluations
of payoffs that reflect her awareness of unawareness. (The approach of modeling aware-
ness of unawareness by “imaginary moves” was proposed by Halpern and Reˆgo, 2006.)
Consider the example in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Game form with awareness of unawareness
raise 2’s raise 2’s 
11
suspicion suspicion
i ti t i ti t
2 222
a           b a           b
’ b’
nves ga e 
’ b’
nves ga e 
” b”
2 222
a             a            a            some
thing
A     B   C       D
2
a           b
In both right and left trees, player 1 can decide whether or not to raise the suspicion
of player 2. If he does not, then player 2 can decide between two actions. Since in this
case player 2’s information set is in the lower tree, she does not even realize that player
1 could have raised her suspicion. If player 1 raises player 2’s suspicion, then player 2’s
information set is in the left tree. She must decide whether to investigate her suspicion
or not. If she doesn’t, then she can decide between two actions but this time she realizes
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that player 1 raised her suspicion (and could have refrained from doing so); and that she
could have chosen to investigate, in which case she may have had ‘something’ else to do,
that she cannot conceptualize in advance. Once she investigates, she becomes aware of
two more actions and her information set is in the right tree. She also realizes that player
1 initially raised her suspicion without being explicitly aware of those actions of hers by
himself. Note that before she decides whether or not to investigate, she is not modeled
as anticipating to be in the right tree, because she cannot conceptualize the nature of
the actions she reveals if and when she investigates.
2.6 The connection to standard extensive-form games
Harsanyi (1967) showed how to transform games with asymmetric information into games
with imperfect information about a move of nature. Can a similar idea be used to
transform any generalized extensive-form game into a standard extensive-form game?
Given a generalized extensive-form game Γ with a partially ordered set of trees T, one
could define the transformation of Γ to be the extensive-form game with an initial move
of nature, in which nature chooses one of the trees in T.
Notice, however, that the resulting structure would not be a standard extensive-form
game. To see this, notice that every standard extensive-form game has the following
property (E): the equivalence class of nodes in which a player considers as possible a
given possibility set of nodes is identical with that possibility set; this set is called an
information set of the player, and in all of its nodes the player has the same set of
available actions. In contrast, in the transformation considered above for games with
misperceptions, this equivalence class may be a strict super-set of the possibility set. For
example, when the generalized game in Figure 8(a) is transformed so as to have an initial
move of nature, the possibility set for the (unique) player is the right node, while the
equivalence class contains both the right and left node.
Thus, if after adding the initial move of nature the information sets are defined to be
synonymous with the possibility sets, the resulting game would be non-standard, because
for some information set there may be additional nodes outside it in which the player
considers it as possible (as in Figure 8(b), where in the left node the player considers
only the right node as possible). If, in contrast, we choose the alternative definition, by
which an information set is the equivalence class in which a player has a particular set
of nodes that she considers as possible, the resulting game would again be non-standard,
this time because the actions available to the player in the nodes of a given information
set might not be identical across these nodes (as in Figure 8(c), where in the left node
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Figure 8:
ta b     c na ure nature
a b   a b     c a b   a b     c a b  
(a) (b) (c)
the player has more available actions than in the right node, even though both are within
the same information set).
There is also another aspect that prevents the above transformation from yielding
a standard extensive-form game. In a standard extensive-form game each player has
a full-support prior on the moves of nature.4 Using Bayes rule, the player therefore
has a well-defined belief about nature at each stage of the game. In contrast, in the
above transformation each player ascribes probability 1 only to one of the initial moves
of nature; moreover, along the path of play the player may switch completely the move
of nature in which she confides even if nothing in the path of play itself imposed such a
switch. Such a switch corresponds to a node in the generalized game in which the player is
defined as becoming aware of new aspects of the dynamic interaction; such an increase
of awareness may occur even when the physical path of play per se did not imply a
surprise, and may have also been compatible with the player’s previous conception of the
game. Thus, if we do add an initial move of nature to connect the trees of the generalized
game, the player’s (evolving) belief about nature cannot be encapsulated within an initial
probabilistic belief about nature, and must be represented explicitly by a belief system
as part of the definition of the game.5
Adding an initial move of nature has a further conceptual drawback. In classical
extensive-form games the implicit assumption is that the players understand the entire
structure of the dynamic interaction as embodied in the game tree.6 Assigning probability
4Moreover, in the classical definition of an extensive-form game the priors of the different players
about nature are actually identical, i.e. the players have a common prior about nature.
5Recall that in standard extensive-form games belief systems appear as components of solution con-
cepts (like sequential equilibrium or extensive-form rationalizability), but not as part of the definition
of the game itself.
6For instance, Myerson (1991, p. 4) puts forward explicitly the tenet that game theory deals with
intelligent players, where “a player in the game is intelligent if he knows everything that we know about
the game and he can make any inference about the situation that we can make.”
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zero to some move of nature is still compatible with realizing what could have happened if
this zero-probability move were nevertheless to materialize. This is conceptually distinct
from being completely unaware of a subset of paths in the game, and it is the latter
concept that we want to model here. Moreover, as we have seen in the example of
the introduction (Figures 3 and 4), it may lead to behavioral predictions different from
unawareness.
Thus, standard extensive-form games are neither technically fit (without further gen-
eralization) for modeling behavior under dynamic misperceptions and unawareness, nor
do they convey the appropriate conceptual apparatus for modeling such interactions,
hence the need for our definition of generalized games.7
3 Extensive-form rationalizability
Pearce (1984) defined extensive-form (correlated) rationalizable strategies by a procedure
of an iterative elimination of strategies. The idea behind the definition involves a notion
of forward induction. In generic perfect-information games, rationalizable strategy pro-
files yield the backward induction outcome, though they need not be subgame-perfect
equilibrium strategies (Reny 1992, Battigalli 1997).
In what follows we extend this definition to generalized extensive-form games.
A belief system of player i
bi = (bi (hi))hi∈Hi ∈
∏
hi∈Hi
∆
(
S
Thi
−i
)
is a profile of beliefs - a belief bi (hi) ∈ ∆
(
S
Thi
−i
)
about the other players’ strategies in
the Thi-partial game, for each information set hi ∈ Hi, with the following properties
• bi (hi) reaches hi, i.e. bi (hi) assigns probability 1 to the set of strategy profiles of
the other players that reach hi.
• If hi precedes h′i (hi  h′i) then bi (h′i) is derived from bi (hi) by Bayes rule whenever
possible.
7Even if one nevertheless prefers to model such interactions using an initial move of nature and
generalizing accordingly the notions of information sets and beliefs about nature in standard extensive-
form games, the properties (I0)-(I6) of our definition constitute restrictions on the structure of such
“extended” standard games that are needed in order to guarantee e.g. that the expectations of each
player about future paths are dynamically consistent (property I3) and perfect recall is well-defined
(property I6).
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Denote by Bi the set of player i’s belief systems.
For a belief system bi ∈ Bi, a strategy si ∈ Si and an information set hi ∈ Hi, define
player i’s expected payoff at hi to be the expected payoff for player i in Thi given bi (hi) ,
the actions prescribed by si at hi and its successors, and conditional on the fact that hi
has been reached.8
We say that with the belief system bi and the strategy si player i is rational at the
information set hi ∈ Hi if either si doesn’t reach hi in the tree Thi , or if si does reach
hi in the tree Thi then there exists no hi-replacement of si which yields player i a higher
expected payoff in Thi given the belief bi (hi) on the other players’ strategies S
Thi
−i .
We say that with the belief system bi and the strategy si player i would be rational at
the information set hi ∈ Hi if there exists no action a′hi ∈ Ahi such that only replacing the
action si (hi) by a
′
hi
results in a new strategy s′i which yields player i a higher expected
payoff at hi given the belief bi (hi) on the other players’ strategies S
Thi
−i .
The difference between these two definitions is as follows. The definition of rationality
of a strategy si at an information set hi takes a global perspective. It is mute regarding
information sets which the strategy si itself rules out. Also, at an information set hi
which si does reach, it considers hi-replacements, which may alter si not only at hi, but
also simultaneously at hi and/or at some of the succeeding information sets of player i.
In contrast, the second definition takes a local perspective. It takes seriously the
reasoning about rationality assuming that hi has been reached, whether this assumption
is realistic (when hi can in fact be reached with a positive probability given the actions
prescribed by si at preceding information sets) or counterfactual (when hi is ruled out by
i’s own actions with the strategy si at preceding information sets). Moreover, it considers
alternative actions a′hi only at hi itself. This is motivated by the implicit assumption that
at hi, player i is certain that at future information sets she will be acting according to the
strategy si, but at the same time she also realizes that at each such future information
set she will have the opportunity to re-consider her action, and that at hi she has no way
to commit herself to the action she will be taking at such a future information set.
We find the second definition more appealing in the context of unawareness. With
unawareness, a player does not necessarily conceive of her entire strategy. Rather, she
might be aware only of a subset of her information sets. She may plan what to do if
8Even if this condition is counterfactual due to the fact that the strategy si does not reach hi. The
conditioning is thus on the event that nature’s moves, if there are any, have led to the information set
hi, and assuming that player i’s past actions (in the information sets preceding hi) have led to hi even
if these actions are distinct than those prescribed by si.
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and when such an information set is reached. However, once her level of awareness gets
increased along the path of play, she may suspect that a similar revelation can happen
again. She may then realize that whatever she plans to do, with her current level of
awareness, is in fact subject to reconsideration. That’s why with unawareness, what a
strategy specifies for future information sets should better be conceptualized as expressing
current beliefs about one’s future actions rather than as a rigid plan to which the player
is bound to conform.
The following lemma describes the close connection between the two definitions when
all of the information sets hi are considered. The lemma follows from the principle of
optimality in dynamic programming. The explicit proof appears in the appendix.
Lemma 1 With a belief system bi of player i,
(i) if a strategy si of player i would be rational at all information sets hi ∈ Hi then it
is rational at all information sets hi ∈ Hi; and
(ii) if a strategy si of player i is rational at all information sets hi ∈ Hi, then there
exists a strategy sˆi which coincides with si at all information sets reached by si,
such that sˆi would be rational at all information sets hi ∈ Hi.
The connection between the two definitions described in Lemma 1 is related to the
notion of a plan of action (Rubinstein 1991, Reny 1992). A plan of player i specifies her
action when she is called to play, and does not specify what she would do at information
sets which are ruled out by that plan. Formally, a plan of action for player i is an
equivalence class of strategies Pi ⊂ Si such that two strategies si, sˆi are in Pi if and only
if for every strategy profile s−i of the other players, (si, s−i) and (sˆi, s−i) induce the same
distribution over terminal nodes in each of the trees of the game Γ. If si ∈ Pi we say
that the strategy si induces the plan of action Pi.
With this terminology, Lemma 1 implies:
Lemma 2 For a given belief system bi of player i, there exists a strategy si which is
rational at all information sets hi ∈ Hi and induces the plan of action Pi if and only
if there exists a strategy sˆi which would be rational at all information sets hi ∈ Hi and
induces the plan of action Pi.
We now turn to define rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games.
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Definition 1 (Would-be rationalizable strategies) Define, inductively, the follow-
ing sequence of belief systems and strategies of player i.
B1i = Bi
S1i = {si ∈ Si: there exists a belief system bi ∈ B1i
with which for every information set hi ∈ Hi player i is rational at hi}
...
Bki = {bi ∈ Bk−1i : for every information set hi, if there exists some profile of the other
players’ strategies s−i ∈ Sk−1−i =
∏
j 6=i S
k−1
j such that s−i reaches hi in the tree Thi, then
bi (hi) assigns probability 1 to S
k−1,Thi
−i }
Ski = {si ∈ Si: there exists a belief system bi ∈ Bki with which for every information set
hi ∈ Hi player i would be rational at hi}
The set of player i’s would-be rationalizable strategies is
S∞i =
∞⋂
k=1
Ski .
Remark 3 Ski ⊆ Sk−1i for every k > 1.
Proof. Consider si ∈ Ski . By definition, si would-be rational at each of player i’s
information sets given some belief system bi ∈ Bki . Since Bki ⊆ Bk−1i , si would also be
rational at each of player i’s information sets given a belief system in Bk−1i , namely given
bi. Hence si ∈ Sk−1i . 
The generalization of Pearce’s (1984) notion of extensive-form correlated rationaliz-
able strategies is introduced next. The inductive definition below generalizes Definition
2 in Battigalli (1997), which he proved to be equivalent to Pearce’s original definition.
Definition 2 (Extensive-form correlated rationalizable strategies) For k ≥ 1 let
Bˆki , Sˆ
k
i be defined inductively as B
k
i , S
k
i above, respectively, the only change being that the
phrase “for every information set hi ∈ Hi player i would be rational at hi ” in the
definition of Ski is changed to “for every information set hi ∈ Hi player i is ratio-
nal at hi” in the definition of Sˆ
k
i . The set of player i’s extensive-form correlated
rationalizable strategies is
Sˆ∞i =
∞⋂
k=1
Sˆki .
21
Remark 4 Sˆki ⊆ Sˆk−1i for every k > 1.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Remark 3 above. 
Lemma 2 above implies the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The set of strategies Ski is contained in Sˆ
k
i , but S
k
i induces a set of plans
of action identical to the set of plans of action induced by Sˆki . Consequently, the set
of would-be rationalizable strategies is contained in the set of extensive-form correlated
rationalizable strategies,
S∞i =
∞⋂
k=1
Ski ⊆ Sˆ∞i =
∞⋂
k=1
Sˆki
but both sets induce the same set of plans of actions.
The inclusion mentioned in the proposition may be strict. For instance, in our first
example in the introduction (Figure 1), it is rationalizable for player 1 not to give the
car to player 2 and to subsequently go to the Bach concert, but to have gone to the
Stravinsky concert (or to the Bach concert, or to the Mozart concert) had he given the
car to 2. In contrast, the only would-be rationalizable strategy of player 1 is not to give
the car to player 2 and subsequently attend the Bach concert, but to have gone to the
Mozart concert had he given the car to player 2. As the proposition asserts, no difference
arises between rationality and would-be rationality along the unique realized path.
Proposition 2 The set of would-be rationalizable strategies is non-empty. Consequently,
the set of extensive-form correlated rationalizable strategies is non-empty.
The proof is in the appendix.
What are the would-be rationalizable strategies in our battle-of-the-sexes example
from the introduction (Figure 2)?
Remark 5 In the Bach-Stravinsky-Mozart example with unawareness from the introduc-
tion (Figure 2), no player has a unique would-be rationalizable strategy.
Proof. At the first level, any strategy would-be rational for player I except all strategies
that prescribe going to the Mozart concert after “don’t tell”. For player II, both the Bach
concert and the Stravinsky concert would-be rational if he is unaware of the Mozart
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concert. If he is aware of the Mozart concert, then only this concert is rational since it
is a dominant action. Thus, S1II = {(B,M), (S,M)}. Not telling player II about the
Mozart concert and going to the Bach concert would-be rational for player I assuming
that she believes with probability at least 1
2
that player II will go to the Bach concert
under such circumstances. Telling player II about the Mozart concert and going to the
Mozart concert would-be rational for player I if she believes with probability at least 1
2
that player II would go to the Stravinsky concert if not told about the Mozart concert.
To summarize,
S2I =
{
(“don’t tell”, B,M,B), (“don’t tell”, B,M, S),
(“tell”, B,M,B), (“tell”, B,M, S), (“tell”, S,M,B), (“tell”, S,M, S)
}
where the second (resp. third) component of the strategy vector refers to player I’s choice
after history “don’t tell” (resp. “tell”), and the last component denotes the action in the
lower subtree. Finally, note that SkII = S
1
II for k ≥ 1 and SkI = S2I for k ≥ 2. 
When we compare this example to the game in which both players are aware of the
Mozart concert but player I has the option of not providing her car for going to this
concert (Figure 1), we note that the strategic implications of unawareness of actions are
distinct from a situation in which both players are aware of the actions but some action
may not always be available. The reason is that if player I keeps player II unaware
of the Mozart concert, then player II can not infer the intention of player II to go to
the Bach concert. In other words, awareness of an available action (providing the car
for going to the Mozart concert) and certainty that it hasn’t been taken has stronger
strategic implications than unawareness of the very same action.
In the Bach-Stravinsky-Mozart example with unawareness from the introduction (Fig-
ure 2), the would-be rationalizable outcome is not unique. This is in contrast to the
example with unavailability of actions instead, where there is a unique would-be ratio-
nalizable outcome. However, there exist also games where with unavailability of actions
there are more would-be rationalizable outcomes than with unawareness of the same
actions, as the example in Remark 8 in Section 5 demonstrates.
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4 Prudent rationalizability
In normal-form games, iterated admissibility (i.e. iterative elimination of weakly domi-
nated strategies) is a refinement of rationalizability. Van Damme (1989) and more gener-
ally Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992) showed that iterated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies singles out the forward induction outcome in money-burning games.9 One in-
terpretation of iterated admissibility is that in every round of elimination, each player is
prudent and hence does not exclude completely any strategy profile of the other players
which has not been thus far eliminated. In this section, we use the idea of prudence to
define an analogous notion of rationalizability for dynamic games:
Definition 3 (Prudent rationalizability) Let
S¯0i = Si
For k ≥ 1 define inductively
B¯ki =
bi ∈ Bi :
for every information set hi, if there exists some profile
s−i ∈ S¯k−1−i =
∏
j 6=i S¯
k−1
j of the other players’ strategies
such that s−i reaches hi in the tree Thi , then the support
of bi (hi) is the set of strategy profiles s−i ∈ S¯k−1,Thi−i that reach hi

S¯ki =
{
si ∈ S¯k−1i :
there exists bi ∈ B¯ki such that for all hi ∈ Hi player i
would be rational at hi
}
The set of prudent rationalizable strategies of player i is
S¯∞i =
∞⋂
k=1
S¯ki
Proposition 3 The set of player i’s prudent rationalizable strategies is non-empty.
Proof. First, observe that B¯ki 6= ∅ for every k ≥ 1, because if an information set
hi ∈ Hi is reached by some s−i ∈ S¯k−1−i , then s−i reaches also all of i’s information sets
that precede hi in the tree Thi .
9A similar result was shown by Herings and Vannetelbosch (1999) who defined iterated admissibility
in terms of full support beliefs and called it trembling-hand perfect rationalizability.
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We proceed by induction. S¯0i = Si and hence non-empty. Notice also that for every
bi ∈ B¯1i , a standard backward induction procedure on the arborescence of information
sets Hi yields a strategy si ∈S¯1i with which player i would be rational ∀hi ∈ Hi given bi.
Suppose, inductively, we have already shown that ∀i ∈ I S¯k−1i 6= 0 (and hence that
S¯k−1−i 6= 0), and also that for every bi ∈ B¯k−1i there exists a strategy si ∈ S¯k−1i with which
player i would be rational ∀hi ∈ Hi given bi.
Let bi ∈ B¯ki . Let H˙i ⊆ Hi be the set of i’s information sets not reached by any profile
s−i ∈ S¯k−1−i but reached by some profile s−i ∈ S¯k−2−i . If H˙i 6= ∅, for every hi ∈ H˙i with no
predecessor in H˙i, modify (if necessary) bi (hi) so as to have full support on the profiles in
S¯k−2−i that reach hi, and in succeeding information sets modify bi by Bayes rule whenever
possible. Denote the modified belief system by b˙i. Then by construction also b˙i ∈ B¯ki .
Consider a sequence of belief systems bi,n ∈ B¯k−1i such that
b˙i =
(
b˙i (h
′
i)
)
h′i∈Hi
≡
(
lim
n→∞
bi,n (h
′
i)
)
h′i∈Hi
and given this sequence10 bi,n ∈ B¯k−1i let si,n ∈ S¯k−1i be a corresponding sequence of
strategies with the property that given bi,n, it is the case that with the strategy si,n
player i would be rational at every hi ∈ Hi. Since player i has finitely many strategies,
some strategy si appears infinitely often in the sequence si,n. Since expected utility is
linear in beliefs and hence continuous, also given b˙i it is the case that with the strategy
si player i would be rational at every hi ∈ Hi. Hence si ∈ S¯ki as well.
Now, since player i’s set of strategies Si is finite and by definition S¯
k+1
i ⊆ S¯ki for
every k ≥ 1, for some ` we eventually get S¯`i = S¯`+1i ∀i ∈ I and hence B¯`+1i = B¯`+2i
∀i ∈ I. Inductively,
∅ 6= S¯`i = S¯`+1i = S¯`+2i = ...
and therefore
S¯∞i =
∞⋂
k=1
S¯ki = S¯
`
i 6= ∅
as required. 
10To construct such a sequence bi,n ∈ B¯k−1i , for every information set h′i ∈ Hi not reached by any
s−i ∈ S¯k−1−i define bi,n (h′i) = b˙i (h′i) for every n ≥ 1; and for every h′i ∈ Hi with no predecessors but
reached by some profile s−i ∈ S¯k−1−i define bi,n (h′i) ∈ ∆
(
S¯k−1−i
)
to be any converging sequence of beliefs
such that for every n ≥ 1 the support of bi,n (h′i) is the subset of profiles in S¯k−2−i that reach h′i, while
limn→∞ bi,n (h′i) = b˙i (h
′
i) . In succeeding information sets reached by some si ∈ S¯k−1−i define bi,n (h′i) by
Bayes rule whenever possible.
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4.1 A first tension between rationalization and prudence:
Divining the opponent’s past behavior
In normal-form games, iterated admissibility is a refinement of rationalizability. Some-
what surprisingly, in extensive-form games prudent rationalizability is not a refinement
of would-be rationalizability, as the following example (Figure 9) demonstrates.
Figure 9:
I
a b c
II6 6, 
d     e          f      d       e          f
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In this example, player 1 can guarantee herself the payoff 6 by choosing a and ending
the game. If player 2 is called to play, should he believe that player 1 chose b or c? If
player 1 is certain that player 2 is rational, she is certain that player 2 will not choose f .
Hence, if player 2 is certain that player 1 is certain that he (player 2) is rational, then
at his information set player 2 is certain that player 1 chose c. The reason is that among
player 1’s actions leading to 2’s information set, c is the only action which, assuming
2 believes c was chosen and that 2 is rational and will hence choose e, yields player 1
the payoff 6, which is just as high as the payoff she could guarantee herself with the
outside option a. Hence (a, e) and (c, e) are the profiles of extensive-form (correlated)
rationalizable strategies (as well as would-be rationalizable strategies) in this game.
The notion of prudence, in contrast, embodies the idea that being prudently rational,
player 1 shouldn’t rule out completely any of 2’s possible choices, and hence that c is
strictly inferior for player 1 relative to her outside option a. Hence, if 2’s information set
is ever reached, the only way for 2 to rationalize this is to believe that 1 chose b, based on
a belief ascribing a high probability to the event that 2 will foolishly choose f. Player 2’s
best reply to b is d; and player 1’s best reply to d is a. Thus, the only profile of prudent
rationalizable strategies in this game is (a, d).
This example demonstrates that in dynamic interactions the notions of rationalization
and prudence might involve a tension. Extensive-form rationalizability embodies a best-
rationalization principle (Battigalli 1997, Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2002); it is driven by
the assumption that in each of his information sets, a player assesses the other players’
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future behavior by attributing to them the ‘highest’ level of rationality and mutual cer-
tainty of rationality consistent with the fact that the information set has indeed been
reached. But, with the additional criterion of ‘prudence’, what should a player believe
about the behavior of his opponent if, as in the example, the opponent’s only action
which is compatible with common certainty of rationality is imprudent on the part of the
opponent?
The definition of prudent rationalizability resolves this tension unequivocally in fa-
vor of the prudence consideration. It remains open whether and how a more balanced
and elaborate definition could resolve the tension in less an extreme fashion. We plan
to address this challenge in future work. However, any definition would have to cut
the Gordian knot in the above example in one particular way, choosing either d or e,
and indeed both potential resolutions are backed by sensible intuitions. This suggests
that for dynamic interactions we need not necessarily expect one ultimate definition of
rationalizability taking into account both rationalization and prudence.
Remark 6 The definition of prudent rationalizability employs would-be rationality. For
standard extensive-form games, Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2007) studied the con-
nection between extensive-form iteratively admissible strategies (defined on the basis of
rationality rather than would-be rationality) and extensive-form rationalizability. They
showed that under a “no relevant convexities” condition, extensive-form rationalizability
and extensive-form iterated admissibility coincide. However, the example in Figure 9 does
not satisfy this condition, and hence demonstrates that in general extensive-form iterated
admissibility is not a refinement of extensive-form rationalizability.
Nevertheless, as far as paths of play are concerned, in the above example the set of
paths induced by prudent rationalizability (the path a) is a subset of the paths induced
by (would-be) rationalizability (the paths a and (c, e) ). This is an instance of a general
phenomenon:
Proposition 4 (Prudent rationalizability refines would-be rationalizable paths)
The set of paths induced by profiles of prudent rationalizable strategies is a subset of the
paths induced by profiles of would-be rationalizable strategies (or, equivalently, the paths
induced by profiles of extensive-form correlated rationalizable strategies).
The proof is in appendix A.
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4.2 The refining power of prudent rationalizability
We now bring two examples demonstrating the refining power of prudent rationalizability.
The first example was originally analyzed (for the full awareness case) by Milgrom and
Roberts (1986) using sequential equilibrium. A second example is due to Ozbay (2007).
4.2.1 Milgrom-Roberts (1986) verifiable communication
Consider a merchandize whose quality qi ∈ {q1, . . . , qn} is known to its seller, while a
buyer knows only the prior probability distribution (p1, . . . , pn) of the qualities, where
pi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. For each quality level qi the seller is better off the larger the
quantity that she sells, while the utility of the buyer from the merchandize is strictly
concave in the quantity purchases with a single peak at β (qi). Furthermore,
β (q1) < · · · < β (qn) .
Before sale takes place, the seller has the option of providing the buyer with a certified
signal about the quality of her merchandize, proving to the seller that the quality is within
some range {qmin, . . . , qmax} containing the actual quality qi.
Milgrom and Roberts (1986) proved that if the buyer’s utility is strictly concave then
there is a unique sequential equilibrium, in which when the quality is qi the seller certifies
to the buyer a range (possibly a singleton) {qmin, . . . , qmax} in which qmin = qi, while the
buyer is skeptical and always buys β (qmin). Thus, in this unique sequential equilibrium
the quality qi is fully revealed to the seller, who buys the optimal quantity β (qi) for him.
We proceed with the caveat that the quantities which can be demanded by the buyer
belong to a finite, fine grid (recall that, formally, in our formulation each player has finitely
many available actions in each information set). For simplicity, we assume further that
the quantities β (qi) , i = 1, . . . , n belong to this grid. For 1 ≤ m < n we denote by
[β (qm) , β (qn)] the set of quantities in this grid at least as large as β (qm) and no larger
than β (qn).
Proposition 5 The strategy to buy β (qmin) when confronted with the certification that
the quality is in the range {qmin, . . . , qmax} is also the unique prudent rationalizable strat-
egy for the buyer, and certifying some range {qmin, . . . , qmax} in which qmin = qi constitute
the prudent rationalizable strategies of the seller.
Thus, any profile of prudent rationalizable strategies in this game yields the full rev-
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elation outcome indicated by Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
Proof of Proposition 5. When the buyer is confronted with the certificate {qn}, his
unique level-1 (prudent) rationalizable action is to buy β (qn), while when he is confronted
with some range {qm, . . . , qn} all the quantities in the interval [β (qm) , β (qn)] are level-
1 (prudent) rationalizable (because any posterior belief of the buyer about the qualities
with support {qm, . . . , qn} can be derived from a belief of the buyer that the seller provides
the certificate {qm, . . . , qn} with an appropriate probability ri when the seller knows that
the quality is qi ∈ {qm, . . . , qn}.) Consequently, the only level-2 prudent rationalizable
strategies of the seller are those in which she provides the certificate {qn} when the quality
is qn (because any other certificate that she can provide {qm, . . . , qn} will yield an expected
sale strictly smaller than β (qn) with a full support belief about the level-1 prudent
rationalizable strategies of the buyer, that have actions in the range [β (qm) , β (qn)]).
Assume, inductively, that we have already proved that in all the level-(2k − 1) prudent
rationalizable strategies of the buyer, for every i = 0, . . . , k − 1 he buys the quantity
β (qn−i) when confronted with a certificate of the form {qn−i, . . . , q`}, and that in all
the level-2k prudent rationalizable strategies of the seller she indeed provides such a
certificate when the quality is qn−i. Then in all the level-(2k + 1) (prudent) rationalizable
strategies of the buyer he buys the quantity β (qn−k) when confronted with a certificate
of the form {qn−k, . . . , q`} (because he believes that such a certificate could only be
presented to him with the quality qn−k, as by the induction hypothesis with each higher
quality all the level-2k prudent rationalizable strategies of the seller present a certificate
where that higher value is the minimal value). Furthermore, when confronted with some
range {qm, . . . , qn−k, . . . , q`} all the quantities in the interval [β (qm) , β (qn−k)] are level-
(2k + 1) (prudent) rationalizable (because any posterior belief of the buyer about the
qualities with support {qm, . . . , qn−k} can be derived from a belief of the buyer on the
level-2k prudent rationalizable strategies of the seller in which the seller provides the
certificate {qm, . . . , q`} with an appropriate probability ri when the seller knows that the
quality is qi ∈ {qm, . . . , qn−k}.)
Consequently, in all the level-(2k + 2) prudent rationalizable strategies of the seller
she provides the certificate {qn−k, ..., q`} when the quality is qn−k (because any other
certificate that she can provide {qm, . . . , qn−k, . . . , q`} will yield an expected sale strictly
smaller than β (qn−k) with a full support belief about the level-(2k + 1) prudent ratio-
nalizable strategies of the buyer, that have actions in the range [β (qm) , β (qn−k)]).
Hence, the inductive claim obtains in particular for k = n − 1, concluding what we
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wanted to prove. 
In fact, it is not difficult to see that the above argument does not depend on the
assumption that the available certificates consist of ranges of qualities (containing the
true quality). For the argument to hold it is enough to assume that for each quality level
qi one of the available certificates is the fully revealing certificate {qi}.
Multi-dimensional certificates and unawareness. Assume now that there are sev-
eral dimensions of quality along which such certifications could be provided. To fix ideas,
consider two dimensions with two values in each:
L0, H0, L∗, H∗
so, for instance, in the state L0 the available certificates are {L,H}×{0,∗ }, {L}×{0,∗ },
{L,H} × {0} and {L} × {0}.
Assume further that
β (L∗) < β
(
L0
)
< β
(
H0
)
< β (H∗)
Since the singleton certificates
{L} × {∗} , {L} × {0} , {H} × {0} , {H} × {∗}
are available, the above argument obtains and full revelation takes place in any profile of
prudent rationalizable strategies of the players.
Assume, however, that the buyer is initially aware only of the {L,H} dimension and
is unaware of the {0,∗ } dimension; he evaluates the merchandize as having the default
quality L0 when confronted with the certificate {L}, and similarly, with the certificate
{H} he evaluates the merchandize as having the default quality H0. Assume further that
the seller knows this, and that by presenting the certificates {∗}, {0} or {0,∗ } the seller
inter alia makes the buyer aware of the {0,∗ } dimension.
Intuitively, it is clear that the seller will want to make the buyer aware of this extra
dimension when the quality is H∗, because this will lead the buyer to demand the high
quantity β (H∗). In contrast, when the actual quality is L∗, the seller will prefer not
to present any certificate at all along the dimension {0,∗ }: This way the buyer will
remain unaware of this extra dimension, and will demand the quantity β (L0) (because
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unraveling and full revelation will occur only along the {L,H} dimension); if the seller
were to make the buyer aware of this extra dimension, the buyer would have demanded
only β (L∗) < β (L0).
This strategic interaction is represented in the following generalized game form (Fig-
ure 10). Initially, nature, c, selects a state out of {L0, L∗, H0, H∗}. The seller observes
the state of nature and chooses a certificate. Unless the seller presents a certificate in-
volving the dimension {0,∗ }, the buyer remains unaware of it. This is indicated by the
intermitted arrows from nodes in the upper tree to nodes in the lower tree. E.g., if the
seller selects the certificate {L}, then the buyer remains unaware of the {0,∗ } dimension
and views the game as represented by the lower tree. In particular, his information set
is a singleton containing the node after nature selects L and the seller reports {L} in
the lower tree. If the seller presents a certificate involving the {0,∗ }-dimension, then the
buyer becomes aware of it and he conceives of the entire generalized game. For instance,
if the seller selects the certificate {L,H}×{0,∗ }, then the buyer’s information set is given
by the upmost information set drawn as an intermitted line connecting four nodes.
4.2.2 An example by Ozbay (2007)
To demonstrate the extra power of prudent rationalizability, consider the following ex-
ample of dynamic interaction with unawareness, which is a variant of example 3 in Ozbay
(2007). There are 3 states of nature, ω1, ω2, ω3. A chance move chooses one out of four
potential distributions over the states of nature:
δ1 = (1, 0, 0)
δ2 = (0, 1, 0)
δ3 = (0, 0, 1)
δ4 =
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
An Announcer gets to know the distribution (but not the realization of the state of
nature). A Decision Maker (DM) is initially aware only of the state ω1 (and hence the
DM is certain that ω1 will be realized with certainty). However, before the DM chooses
what to do, the Announcer can choose to make the DM aware of either ω2, ω3, none of
them or both of them. Increased awareness makes the DM aware of the relevant marginals
of the distributions. For instance, if the Announcer makes the DM aware of ω2, the DM
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becomes aware of the set of distributions
δ1|{ω1,ω2} = (1, 0)
δ2|{ω1,ω2} = (0, 1)
δ4|{ω1,ω2} =
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
and also becomes certain that the Announcer knows which of these is the true distribu-
tion.11
Subsequently, the DM should choose one out of three possible actions – left, middle
or right. The payoffs to the players as a function of the chosen action and the state of
nature appear in the following table:
left middle right
ω1 3, 3 0, 0 2, 2
ω2 0, 0 5, 5 2, 2
ω3 2, 2 0, 0 2, 2
The game is thus described in Figure 11 in the following page.
It is obvious that if the Announcer announces nothing, and hence the DM is certain
that ω1 prevails, the DM will choose ‘left’.
What happens if the Announcer makes the DM aware of ω2? The information set of
the DM becomes {
δ1|{ω1,ω2} , δ2|{ω1,ω2} , δ4|{ω1,ω2}
}
The DM may then assign a high probability to δ1|{ω1,ω2} ,
12 and this will lead the DM
to choose ‘left’. Hence, assuming such a belief by the DM, it is rationalizable for the
Announcer to make the DM aware of ω2 when the Announcer knows that the true dis-
11In the spirit of Footnote 3 above, in Ozbay’s example and in what follows the DM’s beliefs about
these marginal distributions will not be necessarily related to the prior probabilities with which the dis-
tributions were chosen by the chance move. That’s why we do not even bother to specify the probabilities
with which the chance move chooses the different distributions.
Put differently, instead of describing this game by a partially ordered set of trees, one for each level
of awareness as in Figure 11, we could have replaced each tree with an arborescence in which the
initial chance move is erased. Allowing for arborescences instead of trees in the framework for dynamic
unawareness of Section 2 is straightforward, but for the sake of clarity of the exposition we avoid this
explicit generalization in the body of the paper.
12That is, the DM may assign a high probability to strategies of the Announcer by which the Announcer
announces ω2 (and cause the DM’s information set to become
{
δ1|{ω1,ω2} , δ2|{ω1,ω2} , δ4|{ω1,ω2}
}
) when
the Announcer has learned that the true distribution is δ1.
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tribution is δ1 (i.e. when the Announcer knows that ω1 will be realized with probability
1).
This is not very sensible, though. After all, the Announcer can ensure that the
DM chooses ‘left’ by not announcing any new state. When the Announcer likes the
DM to choose ‘left’, it makes no sense on the Announcer’s part to announce ω2 and
thus face the risk that the DM assigns a low probability to δ1|{ω1,ω2} and consequently
choose ‘middle’. This idea is captured by Ozbay’s reasoning refinement to his awareness
equilibrium notion13, as well as by prudent rationalizability:
Proposition 6 The DM has a unique prudent rationalizable strategy. With this strat-
egy the DM chooses ‘left’ when no new state is announced, ‘middle’ when only ω2 is
announced, ‘left’ when only ω3 is announced, and ‘right’ when both ω2, ω3 are announced.
Proof. B¯1DM contains belief systems in which in the information set
{
δ1|{ω1,ω2} , δ2|{ω1,ω2} , δ4|{ω1,ω2}
}
(which follows the announcement of only ω2 by the Announcer) the DM’s belief assigns
high probabilities to δ2|{ω1,ω2} , δ4|{ω1,ω2} . The strategies in S¯
1
DM corresponding to these be-
lief systems prescribe ‘middle’ to the DM in the information set
{
δ1|{ω1,ω2} , δ2|{ω1,ω2} , δ4|{ω1,ω2}
}
.
The crucial point is that B¯2Announcer contains only belief systems that assign strictly
positive probabilities to these strategies of the DM. Thus, with any belief system in
B¯2Announcer, it is sub-optimal for the Announcer to announce ω2 in the announcer’s in-
formation set {δ1} , in which the Announcer is certain of ω1.14 Hence, S¯2Announcer does
not contain strategies in which the Announcer announces just ω2 when the announcer’s
information set is {δ1} . We conclude that B¯3DM contains only belief systems in which
the belief at the information set
{
δ1|{ω1,ω2} , δ2|{ω1,ω2} , δ4|{ω1,ω2}
}
assigns probability zero to
δ1|{ω1,ω2} . Hence, S¯
3
DM contains only strategies with which the DM chooses ‘middle’ at
the information set
{
δ1|{ω1,ω2} , δ2|{ω1,ω2} , δ4|{ω1,ω2}
}
.
Furthermore, already S¯1DM contains only strategies with which the DM chooses ‘left’
at the information set
{
δ1|{ω1,ω3} , δ3|{ω1,ω3} , δ4|{ω1,ω3}
}
(i.e. when the Announcer announces
just the new state ω3). This is because prudent rationalizability implies that all the belief
systems in B¯1DM assign a positive probability to strategies of the Announcer with which
the Announcer announces the new state ω3 even when the Announcer’s information set
(from the point of view of the DM!) is
{
δ1|{ω1,ω3}
}
or
{
δ4|{ω1,ω3}
}
.
13As explained in the introduction, we believe that equilibrium notions are somewhat questionable in
the context of unawareness, and hence our focus on rationalizability.
14Because according to every belief system in B¯2Announcer, announcing just ω2 will lead the DM with
a positive probability to choose ‘middle’.
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Also, B¯1DM contains belief systems in which the DM’s belief in the information set
{δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4} (when the Announcer announces both new states ω2, ω3) assigns high proba-
bility to δ2. The strategies in S¯
1
DM corresponding to these belief systems prescribe ‘middle’
to the DM in the information set {δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4} . Hence, B¯2Announcer contains only belief
systems that assign strictly positive probabilities to these strategies of the DM. Thus,
with any belief system in B¯2Announcer, it is sub-optimal for the Announcer to announce
both ω2 and ω3 in the announcer’s information sets {δ1} and {δ3}. Similarly, B¯1DM con-
tains belief systems in which the DM’s belief in the information set {δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4} assigns
high probability to δ1. The strategies in S¯
1
DM corresponding to these belief systems pre-
scribe ‘left’ to the DM in the information set {δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4} . Hence, B¯2Announcer contains
only belief systems that assign strictly positive probabilities to these strategies of the
DM. Thus, with any belief system in B¯2Announcer, it is sub-optimal for the Announcer to
announce both ω2 and ω3 in the Announcer’s information sets {δ1} , {δ2} or {δ3} . We
conclude that B¯3DM contains only belief systems in which the belief at the information
set {δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4} assigns probability zero to δ1, δ2, δ3. That is, B¯3DM contains only be-
lief systems that assign probability 1 to δ4 at the information set {δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4}. Hence,
S¯3DM contains only strategies with which the DM chooses ‘right’ at the information set
{δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4}.
We thus conclude that S¯3DM contains a unique strategy s
∗
DM . This strategy pre-
scribes the DM to choose ‘left’ in the information set
{
δ1|{ω1}
}
(i.e. when the An-
nouncer does not announce any new state), to choose ‘middle’ in the information set{
δ1|{ω1,ω2} , δ2|{ω1,ω2} , δ4|{ω1,ω2}
}
(i.e. when the Announcer announces just the new state
ω2), to choose ‘left’ in the information set
{
δ1|{ω1,ω3} , δ3|{ω1,ω3} , δ4|{ω1,ω3}
}
(i.e. when the
Announcer announces just the new state ω3) and to choose ‘right’ in the information set
{δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4} (i.e. when the Announcer announces both new states ω2, ω3).15 
4.3 A second tension between rationalizability and prudence:
Divining the opponent’s future behavior
In Figure 9 we demonstrated the tension between the considerations of rationalization
and prudence when a player tries to divine his opponent’s past actions. A related but
distinct tension arises when a player tries to deduce the opponent’s future behavior from
past actions of that opponent. Consider the following example in Figure 12.
15This is also the unique strategy of the DM which is part of an awareness equilibrium satisfying
reasoning refinement in Ozbay (2007).
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In this example, in is imprudent for player 1 (since by going out she can guarantee
a payoff of 10, while by moving in she risks getting 0 if player 2 would rather foolishly
choose r). This means that if player 1 does move in and player 2 gets to play, no prudent
strategy in S¯11 reaches 2’s information set. Hence, the beliefs B¯
2
2 of player 2 about player
1’s future actions are not restricted. In particular, it contains beliefs by which if player
2 chooses m, player 1 will foolishly choose R (with a high probability). That’s why both
m and ` are prudent rationalizable for player 2.
However, it is not very sensible on the part of player 2 to believe that following m
player 1 may choose R. After all, when player 2 has to move, player 1 has already
proved to be imprudent, but not irrational. Indeed, player 1’s rationalizable (though
imprudent) strategy (in, L) yields her the payoff 10 in conjunction with 2’s only (would-
be) rationalizable strategy `, as well as in conjunction with 2’s prudent rationalizable
strategy m; and this payoff is the same as the payoff player 1 gets from her only prudent
rationalizable strategy (out, L).
Thus, as long as player 1 has been rational (even if imprudent) thus far, it makes more
sense for player 2 to believe that player 1 will continue to be rational (though possibly
imprudent) in the future. Restricting player 2’s beliefs according to this logic would cross
out the non-sensical choice m.
Already Pearce (1984) was well aware of this tension, which motivated his definition of
cautious extensive-form rationalizability. That definition involves refining the set of
rationalizable strategies by another round of strategy elimination with full support beliefs
about the other players’ surviving strategies; and then repeating this entire procedure –
the standard iterative elimination process as in the definition of rationalizability, followed
by one round assuming full-support beliefs – ad infinitum. In the above example, cautious
extensive-form rationalizability does indeed rule out the strategy m for player 2.
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However, as Pearce (1984) himself admits, the definition of cautious extensive-form
rationalizability is not really satisfactory, as the following simple example of his shows.
Figure 13:
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In this example, the strategy d is irrational for player 2. Once d is crossed out, both
a and b are extensive-form rationalizable for player 1, and are actually also cautious
extensive-form rationalizable. Notice that in contrast, b does get crossed out by prudent
rationalizability, and the only prudent rationalizable strategy for player 1 is a.
To sum up, we believe it is worth exploring further a more fine-tuned refinement
of rationalizability which would take prudence considerations into account, one which
would be more subtle than Pearce’s cautious extensive-form rationalizability. As the
above examples suggest, such a definition would be involved, and would take us beyond
the scope of the current paper. We plan to address this issue in future work.
4.4 Strategy elimination vs. belief systems reduction
Definition 1 of would-be rationalizable strategies involves, as in Battigalli (1997), an
iterative reduction procedure of belief systems (that is, by definition Bki ⊆ Bk−1i ), and
this definition implies (Remark 3) that strategies get iteratively eliminated (Ski ⊆ Sk−1i );
and the same is true also for extensive-form correlated rationalizable strategies – by
definition Bˆki ⊆ Bˆk−1i and hence Sˆki ⊆ Sˆk−1i . In contrast, the inductive definition of
prudent rationalizable strategies involves an iterative elimination of strategies (that is,
by definition S¯ki ⊆ S¯k−1i , in analogy with the original formulation of Pearce (1984) for
extensive-form rationalizability by an iterative elimination procedure), but in the case of
prudence it is not generally the case that B¯ki ⊆ B¯k−1i . Indeed, when S¯k−i ( S¯k−1−i :
• If the set of strategy profiles in S¯k−i reaching some information set hi ∈ Hi is a
proper, non-empty subset of the strategy profiles in S¯k−1−i that reach hi, then the
support of each belief b¯k−1i (hi) in each belief system b¯
k−1
i ∈ B¯k−1i is strictly larger
than the support of any belief b¯ki (hi) for b¯
k
i ∈ B¯ki .
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• For information sets hi not reached by S¯k−i, there is no restriction (beyond Bayes
rule) on b¯ki (hi) for b¯
k
i ∈ B¯ki . No such restriction is needed, because if we define
mkhi = max
{
m < k : ∃s−i ∈ S¯m−i that reaches hi
}
then for ski ∈ S¯ki the restrictions on i’s actions ski (hi) at hi were already determined
at stage mkhi , since by definition s
k
i ∈ S¯ki ⊆ S¯
mkhi
i .
Is it nevertheless feasible to define prudent rationalizability via a reduction process of
belief systems? Asheim and Perea (2005) proposed to look at systems of conditional
lexicographic probabilities – belief systems in which each belief at an information
set is itself a lexicographic probability system (Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel
1991) about the other players’ strategy profiles. Using belief systems which are condi-
tional lexicographic probabilities we could, in the spirit of Stahl (1995), put forward an
equivalent definition of prudent rationalizable strategies involving an iterative reduction
procedure of belief systems rather than an iterative elimination procedure of strategies.
In each round of the procedure, the surviving belief systems would be those in which at
each information set, ruled-out strategy profiles of the other players (i.e. strategy profiles
outside S¯
mkhi
−i ) would be deemed infinitely less likely than the surviving strategy profiles,
but infinitely more likely than strategy profiles which had already been eliminated in
previous rounds. We leave the precise formulation of such an equivalent definition to
future work.
In their paper, Asheim and Perea (2005) proposed the notion of quasi-perfect ra-
tionalizability, which also involves the idea of cautious beliefs. Quasi-perfect rationaliz-
ability is distinct from our notion of prudent rationalizability. The difference is that with
prudent rationalizability (as with would-be rationalizability), a player need not believe
that another player’s future behavior must be rationalizable to a higher order than that
exhibited by that other player in the past; in contrast, with the quasi-perfect rational-
izable strategies of Asheim and Perea (2005), a player should ascribe to her opponent
the highest possible level of rationality in the future even if this opponent has already
proved to be less rational in the past. That’s why quasi-perfect rationalizability implies
backward induction in generic perfect information games, while our prudent rationaliz-
able strategies need not coincide with the backward induction strategies in such games
(though they do generically lead to the backward induction path – the argument is the
same as in Reny 1992 and Battigalli 1997, since in generic perfect information games pru-
dent rationalizability coincides with extensive-form rationalizability in terms of realized
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paths).
5 Characterization by conditional dominance
5.1 Associated normal-form games
Consider a generalized extensive-form game Γ with a partially ordered set of trees T.
The associated normal-form game G is defined by 〈I, 〈(STi )i∈I , (uTi )i∈I〉T∈T〉, where I is
the set of players in Γ and STi is player i’s set of T -partial strategies. If player i is not
active in trees T ′ ∈ T with T ↪→ T ′, then STi = ∅. Recall that if player i is active at node
n ∈ T , then at node n the strategy si ∈ STi prescribes to her the action si(pii(n)). Hence,
each profile of strategies in ST induces a distribution over terminal nodes in T (even if
there is a player active in T with no information set in T ). uTi (s) is the expected value
of the payoffs associated with the terminal nodes in T reached by s ∈ ST weighted by
the probabilities associated to the moves of nature. (Note that while strategy profiles in
ST reach terminal nodes also in trees T ′ ∈ T, T ↪→ T ′, uTi concerns payoffs in the tree T
only.)
Recall that HTi denotes player i’s set of extensive form information sets in the T -
partial game. For each hi ∈ HTi , let ST (hi) ⊆ ST be the subset of the T -partial strategy
space containing T -partial strategy profiles that reach the information set hi. Define
also STi (hi) ⊆ STi and ST−i (hi) ⊆ ST−i to be the set of player i’s T -partial strategies
reaching hi and the set of profiles of the other players’ T -partial strategies reaching hi
respectively. For the entire game denote by S(hi) ⊆ S the set of strategy profiles that
reach hi. Similarly, Si (hi) ⊆ Si and S−i (hi) ⊆ S−i are the set of player i’s strategies
reaching hi and the set of profiles of the other players’ strategies reaching hi respectively.
Given Γ and its associated normal-form game G, define player i’s set of normal-form
information sets16 by
Xi = {SThi (hi) : hi ∈ Hi}.
These are the “normal form versions” of information sets in the generalized extensive-
form game.
16We abuse here slightly existing terminology. In the literature on standard games, normal-form
information sets refer more generally to subsets of the strategy space of a pure strategy reduced normal-
form game for which there exists an extensive-form game with corresponding information sets (see
Mailath, Samuelson and Swinkels, 1993). For our characterization, we are just interested in the normal
form versions of information sets of a given generalized extensive-form game.
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For T ∈ T, any set Y ⊆ ST is called a restriction for player i (or an i-product set) of
T -partial strategies if Y = Yi × Y−i for some Yi ⊆ STi and Y−i ⊆ ST−i. Clearly, a player’s
normal-form information set is a restriction. I.e., if SThi (hi) is a normal form information
set of player i, then it is a restriction for player i of Thi-partial strategy profiles.
5.2 Iterated conditional strict dominance and extensive-form
rationalizability
We say that si ∈ STi is strictly dominated in a restriction Y ⊆ ST if si ∈ Yi, Y−i 6= ∅,
and there exists a mixed strategy σi ∈ ∆(Yi) such that uTi (σi, s−i) > uTi (si, s−i) for all
s−i ∈ Y−i.
Denote by S =
⋃
T∈T S
T and Si =
⋃
T∈T S
T
i .
For T ↪→ T ′ and a T -partial strategy si ∈ STi , we denote the T ′-partial strategy
sT
′
i ∈ ST ′i induced by si. For s˜i ∈ ST ′i , define
[s˜i] :=
⋃
T ↪→T ′
{si ∈ STi : sT
′
i = s˜i}.
That is, [s˜i] is the set of strategies in Si which at information sets hi ∈ HT ′i prescribe the
same actions as strategy s˜i.
Let (Y T )T∈T be a collection of i-product sets, one for each T ∈ T. Define Y =⋃
T∈T Y
T . Given such a Y, we say that si ∈ STi is conditionally strictly dominated on
(Xi,Y) if (1) there exists a normal-form information set X ∈ Xi, X ⊆ ST such that si is
strictly dominated in X ∩ Y T or (2) for some s˜i ∈ ST ′i , T ↪→ T ′, si ∈ [s˜i], we have that s˜i
is strictly dominated in X ∩Y T ′ for some normal-form information set X ∈ Xi, X ⊆ ST ′ .
(Note that (2) implies (1), but the explicit distinction between (1) and (2) makes the
presentation more transparent.)
For Y define
Ui(Y) = {si ∈ Si : si is not conditionally strictly dominated on (Xi,Y)},
U(Y) =
⋃
T∈T
∏
i∈I
(
Ui(Y) ∩ STi
)
,
and
U−i(Y) =
⋃
T∈T
∏
j∈I\{i}
(
Uj(Y) ∩ STj
)
.
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Define inductively
U0(S) = S,
Uk+1(S) = U(Uk(S)) for k ≥ 0,
U∞(S) =
⋂∞
k=0 U
k(S),
and similarly for Uki (S) and U
k
−i(S).
Example. Consider the game below whose extensive form is identical to the Battle-
of-the-Sexes game with unawareness from the introduction but whose payoffs are quite
different (Figure 14). In this strategic situation, player I may deceive player II by hiding
player II’s dominant action M. As we will see, this example allows us to demonstrate some
features of iterated conditional dominance that we couldn’t have demonstrated with the
introductory example.
Figure 14:
I
n t
II
B S M
B 3, 1 0, 0 0, 4
II
B S
B 3, 1 0, 0
I S 0, 1 1, 0 0, 4
M 4, 0 2, 3 2, 6
I S 0, 1 1, 0
M 4, 0 2, 3
II
B S
I
B 3, 1 0, 0
S 0, 1 1, 0
The associated normal form is given in Figure 15. The lower strategic form game
is the normal form associated with the T ′-partial extensive-form game and the normal
form associated with the T -partial extensive-form game is the upper strategic form game.
Player I is the row player, while player II is the column player. For the row player in
the upper strategic form, the first component of her strategy refers to actions at the root
of the upper tree, the second to her action in the upper left subgame, the third to the
upper right subgame, and the last component to the action in the lower game. For the
column player, the first component of his strategy refers to the action taken in the upper
information set while the second is the action taken in the lower information set.
42
Figure 15: The Associated Normal Form Game
T BB BS SB SS MB MS
nBBB 3, 1 0, 0 3, 1 0, 0 3, 1 0, 0
nSBB 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0
nMBB 4, 0 2, 3 4, 0 2, 3 4, 0 2, 3
nBSB 3, 1 0, 0 3, 1 0, 0 3, 1 0, 0
nSSB 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 1, 0 1, 0
nMSB 4, 0 2, 3 4, 0 2, 3 4, 0 2, 3
nBMB 3, 1 0, 0 3, 1 0, 0 3, 1 0, 0
nSMB 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 1, 0 1, 0
nMMB 4, 0 2, 3 4, 0 2, 3 4, 0 2, 3
nBBS 3, 1 0, 0 3, 1 0, 0 3, 1 0, 0
nSBS 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 1, 0 1, 0
nMBS 4, 0 2, 3 4, 0 2, 3 4, 0 2, 3
nBSS 3, 1 0, 0 3, 1 0, 0 3, 1 0, 0
nSSS 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 1, 0 1, 0
nMSS 4, 0 2, 3 4, 0 2, 3 4, 0 2, 3
nBMS 3, 1 0, 0 3, 1 0, 0 3, 1 0, 0
nSMS 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 1, 0 1, 0
nMMS 4, 0 2, 3 4, 0 2, 3 4, 0 2, 3
tBBB 3, 1 3, 1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 4 0, 4
tSBB 3, 1 3, 1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 4 0, 4
tMBB 3, 1 3, 1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 4 0, 4
tBSB 0, 1 0, 1 1, 0 1, 0 0, 4 0, 4
tSSB 0, 1 0, 1 1, 0 1, 0 0, 4 0, 4
tMSB 0, 1 0, 1 1, 0 1, 0 0, 4 0, 4
tBMB 4, 0 4, 0 2, 3 2, 3 2, 6 2, 6
tSMB 4, 0 4, 0 2, 3 2, 3 2, 6 2, 6
tMMB 4, 0 4, 0 2, 3 2, 3 2, 6 2, 6
tBBS 3, 1 3, 1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 4 0, 4
tSBS 3, 1 3, 1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 4 0, 4
tMBS 3, 1 3, 1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 4 0, 4
tBSS 0, 1 0, 1 1, 0 1, 0 0, 4 0, 4
tSSS 0, 1 0, 1 1, 0 1, 0 0, 4 0, 4
tMSS 0, 1 0, 1 1, 0 1, 0 0, 4 0, 4
tBMS 4, 0 4, 0 2, 3 2, 3 2, 6 2, 6
tSMS 4, 0 4, 0 2, 3 2, 3 2, 6 2, 6
tMMS 4, 0 4, 0 2, 3 2, 3 2, 6 2, 6
T ′ B S
B 3, 1 0, 0
S 0, 1 1, 0
Each boxed cell is a normal-form information set. The entire upper strategic form is
the normal-form information set of player 1 (but not player 2) associated with player 1’s
information set at the beginning of the T -partial game (but not in the T ′-partial game).
We denote this information set by X1(∅T ). The upper boxed cell in the upper strategic
form is the normal-form information set of player 1 (but not of player 2) corresponding to
her extensive form information set after the history n in the T -partial game (but not in
the T ′-partial game). We denote it by X1(n). The lower boxed cell in the upper strategic
form game is the normal-form information set for both player 1 and 2 corresponding
to the information sets after history t in the T -partial game (but not in the T ′-partial
game). We denote it by Xi(t).
Finally, the lower strategic form game is a normal form information set for both
player 1 and 2 both for corresponding information sets in the T ′-partial normal form and
in the T -partial normal form game. It is also the normal-form information set for player
2 corresponding to his information set pi2(n) in the T -partial game. We denote it by
Xi(∅T ′) = X2(n).
The definition of Si is illustrated by the example S2 = {BB,BS, SB, SS,MB,MS,B, S},
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while the definition [s˜i] can be illustrated by [”S”] = {BS, SS,MS, S}. These are all
the strategies of player 2 that prescribe action “S” (“Stravinsky”) at the information set
pi2(n).
The iterated elimination of conditionally strictly dominated strategies proceeds as
follows:
U0i (S) = Si, i = 1, 2
U11 (S) = {nMBB, nMSB, nMMB,nMBS, nMSS, nMMS,
tBMB, tSMB, tMMB, tBMS, tSMS, tMMS,
B, S}
U12 (S) = {MB,B}
For instance, strategy nSBB is conditionally strictly dominated by nMBB in the normal-
form information set X1(∅T ) or X1(n). More interestingly, MS is conditionally strictly
dominated on (X2,S) because MS ∈ [”S”] and S is strictly dominated by B in X2(n). So
this example demonstrates that an action in the upper normal form may be deleted be-
cause of strict dominance in the lower normal form. This is one reason why we chose this
game to demonstrate iterated conditional strict dominance rather than the introductory
example.
Applying the definitions iteratively yields
U21 (S) = {nMBB, nMSB, nMMB,
tBMB, tSMB, tMMB, tBMS, tSMS, tMMS,B}
U22 (S) = U
1
2 (S) = {MB,B}
U31 (S) = {nMBB, nMSB, nMMB,B}
= Uk1 (S) for k ≥ 3
U32 (S) = U
2
2 (S) = {MB,B}
= Uk2 (S) for k ≥ 1
Note that U∞i (S)∩ Si = Sˆ∞i . That is, the set of iterated elimination of conditionally
strictly dominated strategies coincides with the set of extensive-form correlated rational-
izable strategies, and both predict that player I will not give the car to player II and
attend the Mozart concert, while player II will attend the Bach concert.
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The following proposition generalizes the observation made in the example.
Proposition 7 For every finite generalized extensive form game, Uki (S) ∩ Si = Sˆki ,
k ≥ 1. Consequently, U∞i (S) ∩ Si = Sˆ∞i .
The proof is in appendix A.
Remark 7 If in the definition of prudent rationalizability, would-be rationality is re-
placed by rationality, then prudent rationalizability can be characterized by iterated elim-
ination of conditional weakly dominated strategies. The proof is analogous. Instead of
using Lemma 3 in Pearce (1984), we would now use Lemma 4 in Pearce (1984). More-
over, iterated conditional weak dominance is equivalent to iterated admissibility in the
normal-form. This is so because if a strategy weakly dominates a replacement in an
information set, then the payoffs from the strategy and its replacement outside the infor-
mation set must coincide (since otherwise it wouldn’t be a replacement).
Remark 8 Consider a game with unavailability of actions analogous to Figure 1 but with
the payoffs as in the example of this section. Then the set of would-be rationalizable paths
include the one in which player I gives the car to player II and they both go to the Mozart
concert, as well as the paths in which player I doesn’t give the car to player II and then
player I goes either to the Bach or to the Mozart concert and player II goes either to
the Bach or to the Stravisnky concert. In contrast with the example in the introduction,
this example therefore shows that would-be rationalizability does not necessarily yield a
sharper prediction under unavailability of actions than under unawareness of the same
actions.
6 Unawareness
Generalized games can describe many types of games with subjective reasoning. In a
generalized game, a player cannot imagine that she can take an action which is physically
unavailable to her (property I4), but at a given information set pii (n) she can nevertheless
imagine that in a succeeding information set she will have an action which is actually
nowhere available in the tree Tn as in the example of Figure 7. Furthermore, she can
imagine that along the path of play another player will forget the history of play, i.e.
that at a later information set this other player will imagine he is playing in a game tree
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which is completely unrelated to the game tree he imagined at an earlier stage along the
path.
Since our main motivation is to analyze games with unawareness rather than games
with arbitrary kinds of subjective reasoning, it is worthwhile spelling out additional
properties of generalized games in which the only reason for players’ misconception of
the game is unawareness (and mutual unawareness) of available actions. In extensive-form
games with unawareness the set of trees T forms a join semi-lattice under the inclusion
partial order relation . The maximal tree in this join semi-lattice is the modeler’s
objective description of feasible paths of play.
The following additional properties parallel properties of static unawareness structures
in Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006). 17
U0 Confined awareness: If n ∈ T and i ∈ In then pii(n) ⊆ T ′ with T ′  T .
U1 Generalized reflexivity: If T ′  T , n ∈ T , pii(n) ⊆ T ′ and T ′ contains a copy nT ′ of
n, then nT ′ ∈ pii(n).
U2 Introspection: If n′ ∈ pii(n) then pii(n′) = pii(n). (I.e. property I2.)
U3 Subtrees preserve awareness: If n ∈ T ′, n ∈ pii(n), T  T ′, and T contains a copy
nT of n, then nT ∈ pii(nT ).
U4 Subtrees preserve ignorance: If T  T ′  T ′′, n ∈ T ′′, pii (n) ⊆ T and T ′ contains
the copy nT ′ of n, then pii (nT ′) = pii (n).
U5 Subtrees preserve knowledge: If T  T ′  T ′′, n ∈ T ′′, pii (n) ⊆ T ′ and T contains
the copy nT of n, then pii (nT ) consists of the copies that exist in T of the nodes of
pii (n).
The following remark is analogous to Remark 3 in Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006).
Remark 9 U5 implies U3.
Proof. If n ∈ T ′, n ∈ pii(n), T  T ′, and T contains a copy nT of n, then by U5 pii(nT )
must consist of the copies that exist in T of the nodes of pii(n). Since by assumption
n ∈ pii(n) and the copy nT exists in T , we must have nT ∈ pii(nT ). 
17The number of each property corresponds to the respective property in Heifetz, Meier and Schipper
(2006).
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Remark 10 U0 implies I0. U1 implies I1.
Remark 11 U0 is equivalent to I0 and T  T ′ implies T ′  T .
Proof. I0 and T  T ′ implies T ′  T are equivalent to if there exists n ∈ T and i ∈ In
such that pii(n) ⊆ T ′ then T ′  T . 
All these properties are static properties in the sense that they relate nodes on one tree
with copies of those nodes in another tree. One may wonder about dynamic properties
of unawareness. The following property states that a player can not become unaware
during the play.
DA Awareness may only increase along a path: If there is a path n, . . . , n′ in some
subtree T such that player i is active in n and n′, and pii (n) ⊆ T while pii (n′) ⊆ T ′
then T ′  T .
Recall that I3 is the only completely new property imposed on information sets in
generalized games.
Remark 12 Suppose that U0 to U2 hold. Then DA if and only if I3.
Proof. More precisely, we will show first that if I1 holds, then I3 implies DA. Second,
if U0 and I2 holds, then DA implies I3. This implies the result by Remark 10.
If n, ..., n′ is path in T such that i ∈ In ∩ In′ , pii(n) ⊆ T while pii(n′) ⊆ T ′ then by I1
we have n ∈ pii(n) ⊆ T . Then by I3, pii(n′) ⊆ T , which implies DA.
If n′ ∈ pii(n) ⊆ T ′ and n′, ..., n′′ is path in T ′ such that i ∈ In′ ∩ In′′ then by I2,
pii(n
′) = pii(n) and thus by DA if pii(n′′) ⊆ T ′′ then T ′′  T ′. By U0, if n′′ ∈ T ′ then
pii(n
′′) ⊆ T ′′ with T ′′  T ′. Hence T ′′ = T ′, which implies I3. 
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(i) By (I3), all information sets of player i along a path starting in hi and ending at
a terminal node are contained in Thi . Therefore, it is enough to show the claim for
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every subtree T in the generalized extensive-form game. Since player i’s belief system
bi satisfies updating consistency as defined by Perea (2002), the proof of Theorem 3.1 of
Perea (2002) implies the claim.18
(ii) If a strategy siof player i is rational at all information sets hi ∈ Hi, then in
particular si would be rational in all information sets hi ∈ Hi reached by si. Denote by
H−sii the set of information sets not reached by si. By (I3), the expected payoff for player
i (given the belief system bi) from choosing an action in hi ∈ H−sii does not depend on
her choices at information sets outside Thi .
Furthermore, H−sii is an arborescence with respect to the precedence relation  .
Hence, a standard backward-induction procedure on H−sii yields an optimal action a
∗
hi
∈
Ahi for player i (given bi) at hi for every information set hi ∈ H−sii . Replacing by a∗hi the
action prescribed by siat hi for every hi ∈ H−sii yields a new strategy sˆi which would be
rational at all information sets hi ∈ Hi. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We proceed by induction.
B1i is non-empty. Indeed, to construct a belief system bi, for each information set
hi with no predecessors (according to the precedence relation  ) in the arborescence of
information sets Hi, assign to player i a full-support belief bi (hi) on the other players’
strategies S
Thi
−i that reach hi. The full-support guarantees that Bayes rule is applicable
for deriving the beliefs of player i in all her remaining information sets.
Suppose, by induction, we have already shown that Bki is non-empty. We have to
show that Ski is non-empty. For a typical belief system bi ∈ Bki we have to construct
a strategy with which player i would be rational at each of her information sets Hi.
Since Hi is an arborescence, it is standard to construct such a strategy si by backward
induction.
To complete the induction step, observe that Bk+1i is non-empty, because by definition
it singles out a non-empty subset of Bki .
Now, since player i’s set of strategies Si is finite and by Remark 3S
k+1
i ⊆ Ski for every
k ≥ 1, for some ` we eventually get S`i = S`+1i for all i ∈ I and hence B`+1i = B`+2i for all
18Formally, theorem 3.1 in Perea (2002) refers to two-player games, but as he remarks at the top of p.
325, the argument can be extended in a straightforward manner to games with more than two players
and correlated beliefs about other players’ strategies.
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i ∈ I. Inductively,
∅ 6= S`i = S`+1i = S`+2i = ...
and therefore
S∞i =
∞⋂
k=1
Ski = S
`
i 6= ∅
as required. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Denote by (ai, hi) the copy of the action ai of player i ∈ I whenever it appears in the
information set hi. For the purpose of this proof the word “action” will refer to a copy
(ai, hi) of an action at a given information set.
Define a menu of a player to be a (possibly empty) subset of (the union of) her actions
in her information sets.
Define a menu profile to be a profile of menus, one for each player, with the following
property: For each information set hi of player i, her menu in the menu profile contains
at least one action in hi if and only if that information set is reached by a sequence of
actions of the players in the menu profile.
For a menu profile M , denote by Mi the menu of player i in M .
For a menu profile M , denote by P T (M) all the paths from the roots to leaves in the
trees of the T -partial game that one can compose from actions in M and moves of nature
(if there are any). Denote also by P (M) the set of paths from roots to leaves in all the
trees of the generalized games that one can compose from actions in M and moves of
nature.
Now, every product of sets of strategies R =
∏
i∈I Ri (where Ri is a subset of i’s
strategies) induces a menu profile, in which player i’s menu is defined as follows. For
each information set of the player:
1) If the information set is reached by some strategy profile in the set R, the player’s
menu contains all the actions ascribed in that information set by i’s strategies in Ri that
reach the information set.
2) If the information set is not reached by any strategy profile in R, then player i’s
menu contains no action of hers in that information set.
Intuitively, player i’s menu is mute about an information set if and only if that
information set is excluded by the set of strategy profiles R (case 2); otherwise (case 1)
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the menu contains all the actions in that information set that appear in some strategy
of hers in Ri that reaches that information set.
If M is the menu profile induced by R, then every strategy in Ri together with a
belief about R−i induce a belief βT about the paths of actions in P T (M) for every tree
T of the generalized game.
Next, denote by Mk the menu profile induced by Sk =
∏
i∈I S
k
i , the set of level k
would-be rationalizable strategy profiles; and denote by M¯k the menu profile induced by
S¯k =
∏
i∈I S¯
k
i , the set of level k prudent rationalizable strategy profiles.
Proposition 4 is implied by the following lemma:
Lemma 3 For all ` ≥ 0, M¯ ` ⊆M `. In particular M¯∞ ⊆M∞.
Proof. The proof is by induction.
For ` = 0 we have M0 = M¯0, the menu profile which includes all actions at all the
information sets of all the players.
Suppose the claim holds for ` ≤ k.
By the induction hypothesis P (M¯ `) ⊆ P (M `) for every ` ≤ k.
We will now prove the claim for ` = k + 1, i.e. that M¯k+1i ⊆ Mk+1i for every player
i ∈ I.
To this end we have to show that for every player i ∈ I, every s¯k+1i ∈ S¯k+1i , every
information set hi ∈ Hi which is reached both by s¯k+1i and by some strategy profile in
S¯k+1−i (meaning that s¯
k+1
i (hi) ∈ M¯k+1i ), it is the case that
a) hi is also reached by S
k+1, and
b) s¯k+1i (hi) ∈ Mk+1i as well.
In fact, it is enough to show that b) holds. To see this, proceed inductively along
each feasible path of the generalized game (in each of its trees). If player i is the first to
play in this path (apart from nature, if there are nature moves in the path), and if hi is
the information set in which she makes this initial move, then condition a) automatically
obtains for hi, and we only need to prove b). Inductively, if we reach a node in the
path which is not in P
(
M¯k+1
)
, we have nothing to prove for this node’s information set
when considering this path.19 If all the nodes n1 . . . nm in an initial segment of the path
are on a path in P
(
M¯k+1
)
and we have already proved conditions a) and b) for all the
19We may have to consider this information set again when we analyze another path passing through
it.
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information sets of these nodes, then it already follows that a) holds for the information
set of the next node nm+1 in the path [because b) holds for the previous node nm for the
player (or players) active in nm]. It thus remains to show b) for such an information set.
So we now proceed to prove b).
Suppose hi is reached by S¯
k+1
−i and by s¯
k+1
i ∈ S¯k+1i . Since by definition S¯k+1−i ⊆ S¯k−i,
we have s¯k+1i ∈ S¯ki and hence mk+1i (hi) = k. Consider a belief system bi ∈ B¯k+1i with a
full-support belief bi (hi) on the strategy profiles S¯
k
−i that reach hi, and with which s¯
k+1
i
would be rational at hi (i.e. player i cannot improve her expected payoff by changing
s¯k+1i only at hi, from s¯
k+1
i (hi) to some other action a
′
hi
available there).
The strategy s¯k+1i together with the belief bi (hi) on the other players’ strategies induce
a full support belief β on the paths of actions in P (M¯k) reaching hi and along which
player i uses the strategy s¯k+1i . Since by the induction hypothesis P (M¯
k) ⊆ P (Mk), it
follows that β is a belief on the paths of actions in P (Mk) reaching hi and along which
player i uses the strategy s¯k+1i .
Denote by s¯k+1i |a′hi the strategy one gets from s¯k+1i by altering the action at the
information set hi from s¯
k+1
i (hi) to a
′
hi
. The altered strategy s¯k+1i |a′hi together with the
belief bi (hi) on the other players’ strategies induce a full support belief β
′ on the paths
of actions in P (M¯k) reaching hi and along which player i uses the strategy s¯
k+1
i |a′hi .
The fact that s¯k+1i would-be rational given the belief system bi means that in particular
at the information set hi, with the belief bi (hi) on the other players’ strategies, the
expected payoff to player i given β is not smaller than the expected payoff to player i
given β′.
This yields the conclusion b) that we wanted, namely that s¯k+1i (hi) ∈ Mk+1i . 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 7
A general belief system of player i
b˜i = (b˜i(hi))hi∈Hi ∈
∏
hi∈Hi
∆(S
Thi
−i )
is a profile of beliefs – a belief b˜i(hi) ∈ ∆(SThi−i ) about the other players’ strategies in
the Thi-partial extensive-form game, for each information set hi ∈ Hi, such that b˜i(hi)
reaches hi, i.e., b˜i(hi) assigns probability 1 to the set of strategy profiles of the other
players that reach hi. The difference between a belief system and a general belief system
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is that in the latter we do not impose Bayes rule.
For k ≥ 1 let B˜ki and S˜ki be defined inductively like Bˆki , Sˆki in Definition 2, respectively,
the only change being that belief systems are replaced by generalized belief systems.
Lemma 4 Uki (S) ∩ Si = S˜ki for k ≥ 1. Consequently, U∞i (S) ∩ Si = S˜∞i .
Proof of the Lemma. We proceed by induction. The case k = 0 is straight-forward
since U0i (S) ∩ Si = Si = S˜0i for all i ∈ I.
Suppose now that we have shown Uki (S) ∩ Si = S˜ki for all i ∈ I. We want to show
that Uk+1i (S) ∩ Si = S˜k+1i for all i ∈ I.
“⊆”: First we show, if si ∈ Uk+1i (S) ∩ Si then si ∈ S˜k+1i .
si ∈ Uk+1i (S) ∩ Si if si ∈ Si is not conditionally strictly dominated on (Xi, Uk(S)).
si ∈ Si is not conditionally strictly dominated on (Xi, Uk(S)) if for all T ′ ∈ T with
T1 ↪→ T ′ and all s˜i ∈ ST ′i such that si ∈ [s˜i], we have that there does not exist a
normal-form information set X ∈ Xi with X ⊆ ST ′ such that s˜i is strictly dominated in
X ∩ Uk(S).
For any information set hi ∈ Hi, if s˜i ∈ SThii is not strictly dominated in SThi (hi) ∩
Uk(S), then
(i) either s˜i does not reach hi, in which case s˜i is trivially rational at hi; or
(ii) by Lemma 3 in Pearce (1984) there exists a belief b˜i(hi) ∈ ∆(SThi−i (hi)∩Uk−i(S)) for
which s˜i is rational at hi. Since by the induction hypothesis U
k(S) ∩ S = S˜k, we
have in this case that there exists a belief at hi with b˜i(hi)(S˜
k,Thi
−i ) = 1 for which s˜i
is rational at hi.
By definitions of [s˜i] and “reach”, if s˜i reaches hi in the tree Thi and si ∈ [s˜i], then si
reaches hi in the tree Thi . Hence, if s˜i ∈ S
Thi
i is rational at hi given b˜i(hi), then si ∈ [s˜i]
is rational at hi given b˜i(hi).
We need to show that beliefs in (ii) define a generalized belief system in B˜k+1i . Con-
sider any b˜′i = (b˜
′
i(hi))hi∈Hi ∈ B˜k+1i . For all hi ∈ Hi for which there exists a profile of
player i’s opponents’ strategies s−i ∈ S˜k−i that reach hi, replace b˜′i(hi) by b˜i(hi) as defined
in (ii). Call the new belief system b˜i. Then this is a generalized belief system. Moreover,
b˜i ∈ B˜k+1i .
Hence, if si is not conditionally strictly dominated on (Xi, Uk(S)) then there exists
a generalized belief system b˜i ∈ B˜k+1i for which si is rational at every hi ∈ Hi. Thus
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si ∈ S˜k+1i .
“⊇”: We show next, if si ∈ S˜k+1i then si ∈ Uk+1i (S) ∩ Si.
If si ∈ S˜k+1i then there exists a generalized belief system b˜i ∈ B˜k+1i such that for all
hi ∈ Hi the strategy si is rational given b˜i(hi). That is, either
(I) si does not reach hi, or
(II) si reaches hi and there does not exist an hi-replacement of si which yields a higher
expected payoff in Thi given b˜i(hi) that assigns probability 1 to Thi-partial strategies
of player i’s opponents in S˜
k,Thi
−i that reach hi in Thi . By the induction hypothesis,
S˜k−i = U
k
−i(S) ∩ S
Thi
−i . Hence b˜i(hi) ∈ ∆(Uk−i(S) ∩ S
Thi
−i (hi)).
If si ∈ [s˜i] with s˜i ∈ SThii and si reaches hi in the tree Thi , then s˜i reaches hi in the
tree Thi . Hence, if si ∈ [s˜i] with s˜i ∈ S
Thi
i is rational at hi given b˜i(hi), then s˜i is rational
at hi given b˜i(hi).
Thus, if si is rational at hi given b˜i(hi), then s˜i ∈ SThii with si ∈ [s˜i] is not strictly
dominated in Uk−i(S)∩ S
Thi
−i (hi) either because si does not reach hi (case (I)), or because
of Lemma 3 in Pearce (1984) (in case (II)).
It then follows that if the strategy si is rational at all hi ∈ Hi given b˜i then si is not
conditionally strictly dominated on (Xi, Uk(S)). Hence si ∈ Uk+1i (S) ∩ Si. 
Lemma 5 S˜ki = Sˆ
k
i for k ≥ 1. Consequently, S˜∞i = Sˆ∞i .
Proof of the Lemma. Sˆki ⊆ S˜ki for k ≥ 1 since if si is rational at each information
set hi ∈ Hi given the belief system bi ∈ Bi then there exists a generalized belief system
b˜i ∈ B˜ki , namely b˜i = bi, such that si is rational at each information set hi ∈ Hi given b˜i.
We need to show the reverse inclusion, S˜ki ⊆ Sˆki for k ≥ 1. The first step is to show
how to construct a (consistent) belief system from a generalized belief system. Let si be
rational given b˜i ∈ B˜1i , i.e. si ∈ S˜1i . Consider an information set h0i ∈ Hi such that in Thi
there does not exist an information set hi that precedes h
0
i . Define bi(h
0
i ) ≡ b˜i(h0i ).
Assume, inductively, that we have already defined bi for a subset of information sets
H ′i ⊆ Hi such that for each h′i ∈ H ′i all the predecessors of h′i are also in H ′i. For each
successor information set h′′i of each information set h
′
i ∈ H ′i such that h′′i /∈ H ′i define
bi (h
′′
i ) as follows:
53
• If bi (h′i) reaches h′′i define bi (h′′i ) by using Bayes rule, i.e. if s
Th′
i
−i ∈ S−i(h′′i )
bi (h
′′
i ) (s
Th′
i
−i ) =
bi (h
′
i) (s
Th′
i
−i )∑
s˜
T
h′
i
−i ∈S−i(h′′i )
bi(h′i)(s˜
Th′
i
−i )
and bi (h
′′
i ) (s
Th′
i
−i ) = 0 else.
• If bi (h′i) does not reach h′′i let bi(h′′i ) ≡ b˜i(h′′i ).
Since there are finitely many information sets in Hi, this inductive definition will be
concluded in a finite number of steps.
Next, assuming that si is rational at each information set hi ∈ Hi with the generalized
belief system b˜i, we will show that si is also rational at each information set hi ∈ Hi
according to the belief system bi.
Consider again h0i ∈ Hi with no predecessors in Th0i . Since bi(h0i ) = b˜i(h0i ) and si is
rational at h0i given b˜i (h
0
i ), si is also rational at h
0
i given bi (h
0
i ).
Assume, inductively, that we have already shown the claim for a subset of information
sets H ′i ⊆ Hi such that for each h′i ∈ H ′i all the predecessors of h′i are also in H ′i. Consider
a successor information set h′′i of an information set h
′
i ∈ H ′i such that h′′i /∈ H ′i. Notice
that each h′′i -replacement is also an h
′
i-replacement. Therefore,
• If bi (h′i) reaches h′′i , bi (h′′i ) is derived from bi(h′i) by Bayes rule, and hence any h′′i -
replacement improving player i’s expected payoff according to bi (h
′′
i ) would improve
player i’s payoff also according to bi(h
′
i), contradicting the induction hypothesis.
Hence si is rational at h
′′
i given bi (h
′′
i ).
• If bi (h′i) does not reach h′′i , then bi (h′′i ) = b˜i(h′′i ). Hence, si is rational at h′′i also
given bi (h
′′
i ).
Applying the same argument inductively yields S˜ki = Sˆ
k
i ∀k ≥ 1. This concludes the
proof of the lemma. 
Lemmata 4 and 5 together yield Uki (S) ∩ Si = Sˆki for k ≥ 1. Since it applies for all
k ≥ 1 and i ∈ I, this completes the proof of the proposition. 
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